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INTRODUCTION

On January 22, 2008, Ruben Betancourt was admitted to
Trinitas Regional Medical Center in New Jersey for surgery for
malignant thymoma, a cancer of the thymus gland (a small organ
underneath the breastbone).' Following surgery, the patient developed
brain damage due to lack of oxygen and, as a result, lapsed into
unconsciousness. 2 For the next five months, Mr. Betancourt was
admitted to various medical facilities and readmitted finally to
Trinitas in July 2008 for renal failure.3 For six more months, the
unconscious patient remained in the hospital on an artificial
ventilator, receiving renal dialysis and nutrition through tube
feeding. 4

1.
Betancourt v. Trinitas Reg'1 Med. Hosp., No. C-12-09, slip op. at 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. Mar.
4, 2009), available at http://thaddeuspope.com/images/Betancourt-v_trinitas3-4_2_.pdf; see also
National
Cancer
Institute,
Thymoma
and
Thymic
Carcinoma,
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/types/thymoma
(last visited Jan. 22, 2010) (defining
thymoma).
2.
Betancourt, slip op. at 1.
3.
Id. at 1-2.
4.
Id.
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The medical staff at Trinitas determined that Mr. Betancourt
was in an unresponsive, irreversible vegetative state and that further
treatment would be futile.5 As such, they recommended to the
patient's family that life-sustaining treatment be discontinued. 6 The
family disputed the hospital's findings, claiming that the patient
responded to certain stimuli.7 Namely, they insisted that the patient
recoiled when approached by medical providers, responded by opening
his eyes, and turned his head in response to certain voices.8 The
family further described Mr. Betancourt as a "strong willed person
who would not give up," thus leading them to believe that he would
want to continue to receive treatment. As a result, the family insisted
that the healthcare provider uphold this choice.9 What should the
healthcare provider do in this scenario? If disagreement persists, how
should the surrogate decisionmaker respond?
The above example illustrates a futility dispute, which arises
when a patient's surrogate decisionmaker wishes to prolong treatment
that the healthcare provider has deemed medically ineffective.10 A
futility dispute differs from a traditional end-of-life dispute, in which
the surrogate seeks to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment
while the physician believes that treatment should be continued." In
this context, the law recognizes a patient's constitutional and common
law right to refuse treatment.12 By contrast, a futility dispute, also
known as a "reverse" end-of-life dispute, occurs when a patient or
surrogate wants to compel a physician to provide treatment that the
physician deems medically inappropriate.13 Most futility disputes
involve situations in which the treatment definitely or probably
affords the patient some physiologic benefit but offers no reasonable
prospect of recovery.14 The fundamental disagreement of a medical
futility dispute is whether to forgo life-sustaining treatment.

5.
6.
7.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 2-3.

8.
Id. at 3.
9.
Id.
10. See ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE
DECISIONMAKING § 13.01[A]-[B] (3d. ed. 2004) (in a futility case, "the physician recommends to
the patient, or more likely to the surrogate of an incompetent patient, that treatment be
withheld or withdrawn because the physician has concluded that further treatment is futile").
11. Id. § 13.01.
12. CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, JAMES F. BLUMSTEIN & TOYEN A. BRENNAN, HEALTHCARE LAW
AND POLICY 1103 (2d ed. 1998); MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 10, § 2.06.
13. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 10, § 13.01.
14. Id.
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Even when life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn, physicians
remain obligated by ethicalI5 and legal standards of care 16 to continue
palliative care, which relieves pain and helps comfort the patient.17
Some states have even codified the requirement that palliative care be
provided when life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn.18 In addition to
providing care to relieve pain and suffering, healthcare providers
generally will make short-term accommodation of the surrogate's
wishes in order to facilitate the grief process, to allow family members
to say goodbye, and to respect the family's personal values.19 Yet,
surrogates often are not satisfied with a doctor's decision to provide
these forms of care instead of life-sustaining treatment, resulting in a
futility dispute. 20
15. See AM. MED. ASS'N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL
ETHICS
§ 2.20 (2008),
available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/amalpub/physicianresources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics.shtml ("Physicians have an obligation to relieve
pain and suffering and to promote the dignity and autonomy of dying patients in their care. This
includes providing effective palliative treatment even though it may foreseeably hasten death.");

Sandra H. Johnson, The Social, Professional, and Legal Framework for the Problem of Pain
Management in Emergency Medicine, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 741, 748 (2005) ("Physicians have a
well established legal duty to treat pain as a part of their medical treatment of a patient. The
doctor's legal duty to relieve pain is generally supported by policy statements and standards of
professional organizations and by the standards enforced by state licensing boards.").

16.

See Barry R. Furrow, Pain Management and Provider Liability: No More Excuses, 29

J.L. MED. & ETHICS 28, 29 (2001) ("Failure to properly manage pain-to assess, treat, and
manage it-is professional negligence"); Bergman v. Chin, No. H205732-1 (Cal. Super. Ct. June
13, 2001), as discussed in Gilah R. Mayer, Bergman v. Chin: Why an Elder Abuse Case is a Stride

in the Direction of Civil Culpability for Physicians Who Undertreat Patients Suffering from
Terminal Pain, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 313, 327-30, 341 (2003) (finding that failure to treat the
pain of terminally ill patient dying of lung cancer constituted elder abuse and awarding
damages).
17. WHO, WHO Definition of Palliative Care, http://www.who.int/cancer/palliativel
definition/en/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
18. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-573(a) (2008) (notwithstanding provisions providing
for withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, "comfort care and pain alleviation shall be provided
in all cases"); MINN. STAT. § 145B.13(1) (2009) ("[A] decision to administer, withhold, or
withdraw medical treatment after the patient has been diagnosed by the attending physician to
be in a terminal condition must always be based on reasonable medical practice, including ...
continuation of appropriate care to maintain the patient's comfort, hygiene, and human dignity
and to alleviate pain.").

19.

Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harborto UnilaterallyRefuse

Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, 20 (2007).
20. For a recent real life example of a futility dispute, consider the case of Emilio Gonzales.
Emilio was born with Leigh disease, a rare inherited neurometabolic disorder characterized by
rapid degeneration of the central nervous system. Due to this disease, Emilio was deaf, blind,
and ventilator dependent. His healthcare provider claimed that further life-sustaining treatment
would be futile, but his mother insisted on continued treatment. Although Ms. Gonzalez
acknowledged that her son was terminally ill, she nevertheless wanted him to receive a
tracheotomy, a gastrostomy tube, and a bed in a long-term care facility. She urged, "I just want
to spend time with my son ... [;] I want to let him die naturally without someone coming up and
saying we're going to cut off on a certain day." The disagreement between Emilio's mother (the
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Currently, no legal consensus exists regarding the proper
resolution of futility disputes. 2 1 However, courts, commentators, and
healthcare providers generally agree that the courtroom is not the
appropriate venue to resolve these disputes. 22 The Betancourt futility
dispute, in which the patient's daughter eventually initiated court
proceedings to prevent the withdrawal of treatment, demonstrates
this consensus. 23 In support of the position that treatment should be
discontinued, several treating physicians testified that Mr. Betancourt
was "actively dying," that his body was "decomposing and often
septic," and that dialysis treatment was "medically and ethically
inappropriate and inhumane."24 The physicians further explained that
the patient's movements, which the family believed demonstrated Mr.
Betancourt's responsiveness, were entirely reflexive. 25 Nonetheless,
the court held that "the decision to continue or terminate life support
systems is not left to the courts," and instead appointed the plaintiff
as the legal guardian and granted her request for injunctive relief to
restrain the hospital from discontinuing treatment. 26
If the resolution of futility disputes "is not left to the courts," as
the Superior Court of New Jersey and many other courts have held,
then who must make these decisions? Lacking a legislative or judicial
answer to this question, most healthcare institutions have established
internal mechanisms to resolve ethical disputes that arise at the end
of life. 2 7 In over 90 percent of the hospitals providing ethics
surrogate) and the healthcare institution represents a medical futility dispute. Jeffrey P. Burns
& Robert D. Truog, Futility: A Concept in Evolution, 132 CHEST 1987, 1990 (2007).
21. See Elena N. Cohen, Refusing & Forgoing Treatment, in 3 TREATISE ON HEALTHCARE
LAW § 18.06 (Alexander M. Capron & Irwin M. Birnbaum eds., Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2008)
(discussing judicial and non-judicial mechanisms for resolving futility disputes and explaining
that non-judicial dispute resolution may be desirable because court proceedings can be timeconsuming and emotionally and financially costly for both patients and providers citing several
decisions that support this conclusion).
22. See infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
23. Betancourt v. Trinitas Reg'l Med. Hosp., No. C-12-09, slip op. at 3-4, 7 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Mar. 4, 2009) ("The decision to continue or terminate life support systems is not left to the
courts.").
24. Id.
25. Id. The physicians further stated that the patient "does not respond to pain or
spontaneously move his extremities." Id.
26. Id. at 7-8. The hospital appealed the decision, and even though the patient died (while
on the ventilator), the appeal appears to still be going forward. Rebecca Dube, 'Death Panels'
Obscure Real End-of-Life Challenges, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD, Oct. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.forward.com/articles/115597/.

27.

Ellen Fox et al., Ethics Consultation in United States Hospitals:A National Survey, AM.

J. BIOETHICS, Feb. 2007, at 13, 23 (finding that 81 percent of general hospitals and 100 percent of
hospitals with 400 beds or more provide ethics consultations services); see also Cohen, supra note
21, § 18.06 ('To avoid some of the negative aspects of judicial intervention, institutional dispute
resolution mechanisms have been created . . . . One mechanism for resolving disputes that
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consultation, a full ethics committee or a small team of individuals
performs ethics consultation. 28 Accordingly, this Note will focus on the
group model of consulting, using the term "ethics committee" to refer
to any group of individuals designated by a healthcare institution to
address ethical issues involved in a specific, active clinical case.
Even though ethics committees are typically considered
advisory bodies that make only recommendations, they often provide
the effective forum of last resort in the context of a futility dispute. 29
One would assume that impartiality would be a defining quality of a
group vested with such authority to render life-or-death decisions, yet
ethics committees are actually internal bodies comprised primarily of
hospital staff.30 This relationship creates a substantial risk that
inappropriate considerations will influence ethics committee decisions
to continue or withdraw life-sustaining treatment.3 ' For example,
committee members may be improperly influenced by the financial
effects of their decisions, fear of liability, or inherent professional
relationships. 3 2 Yet despite these risks, ethics committees in almost all
states remain free from any substantive or procedural regulation. 33

deserves special attention is the institutional ethics committee."). Although ethics committees
are the most common forum for addressing ethical issues, ethics consultations may utilize an
individual ethicist rather than a committee.
28. Fox et al., supranote 27, at 23.
29. See Alexander M. Capron, Legal Perspectiveson InstitutionalEthics Committees, 11 J.C.
& U.L. 417, 427 (1985) (noting that "[p]eople frequently assert that an ethics committee should
be 'advisory,'" but that "[tlo call it a committee suggests that the group will come to some kind of
closure on the issues that it addresses").
30. See Dianne E. Hoffmann, Does Legislating Hospital Ethics Committees Make a
Difference? A Study of Hospital Ethics Committees in Maryland, the District of Columbia, and
Virginia, 19 LAW MED. & HEALTHCARE 105, 108 (1991) [hereinafter Hoffmann, Does Legislating
Hospital Ethics Committees Make Sense?] (describing the typical composition of ethics
committees in Maryland, the District of Columbia, and Virginia); cf Diane E. Hoffmann,
Regulating Ethics Committees in HealthcareInstitutions - Is It Time?, 50 MD. L. REV. 746, 76368, 782 (1991) [hereinafter Hoffman, Regulating Ethics Committees] (examining the relative
institutional predispositions of ethics committees to reasoned decisionmaking and noting that
"[a] committee that is heavily dominated by medical professionals may not share the same values
as the patients that come before it").
31. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Multi-Institutional Healthcare Ethics Committees: The
Procedurally Fair Internal Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 257, 275-84
(2009) (discussing institutional ethics committees conflicts of interest and concluding that
"[s]ince, in many treatment disputes, the interest of the institution may not align with that of
the patient, [institutional ethics committees] cannot act as sufficiently impartial, independent
decision makers").
32. See infra Part II.
33. See, e.g., Bethany Spielman, Has Faith in HealthcareEthics Consultants Gone Too Far?
Risks of an UnregulatedPractice and a Model Act to Contain Them, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 161, 180
(2001) ("[Tjhe field of ethics consultation remains free of any internal or external regulation.
There is no self-regulation, no registry, no certification, no licensure, and no accreditation of
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Any solution to this problem must uphold the patient's right to
make autonomous medical decisions while at the same time respecting
the physician's right to refuse to provide treatment that is medically
ineffective. 34 Furthermore, it must provide a clear, statutory procedure
for resolving futility disputes that incorporates fundamental due
process protections.35 Most importantly, the mechanism for resolving
futility disputes must not only prohibit those who have conflicts of
interest from making medical decisions on behalf of incompetent
patients; it also must bar improper considerations, including financial,
legal, or professional concerns, from shading the final decision. 36
Fortunately, Iowa has provided a model for such a solution
through the development of substitute medical decisionmaking boards
("SMDBs").37 These serve as substitute decisionmakers for
incompetent patients who lack a surrogate to make medical decisions
on their behalf.3 8 In contrast to internal ethics committees, any
individual with a conflict of interest is precluded from sitting on the
board for that case. 39 Moreover, SMDBs must comply with specific
procedural and decisionmaking regulations that further ensure that
the board will fully evaluate all sides of the dispute and that improper
considerations will not influence their decisions. 40 While the Iowa

training programs."). Maryland is the one exception, which regulates only the composition and
some procedures of the committees. MD. CODE. ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 19-370 to -374.
34. See Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072, 1075 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (holding
that a physician would not be compelled to "provide interventions that in his view would be
harmful, without effect or 'medically inappropriate' "); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 436 (N.J. 1987)
(noting that "the patients' right to self-determination is the guiding principle" in cases regarding
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment).
35. Cf. Susan M. Wolf, Ethics Committees and Due Process:Nesting Rights in a Community
of Caring, 50 MD. L. REV. 798, 844-47 (1991) (discussing the gaps in procedural protections for
patients in the Maryland statutory scheme spelling out ethics committee process).
36. See Mark P. Aulisio et al., Healthcare Ethics Consultation: Nature, Goals, and
Competencies, 133 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 59, 65 (2000) (summarizing the American Society for
Bioethics and Humanities Task Force's report on the core competencies for healthcare ethics
consultation, which includes the conclusion that "Conflicts of Interest Must Be Avoided[.] ... If
ethics consultants have important personal or professional relationships with one or more
parties that could lead to bias . . . the consultants should .. . remove themselves from the case.").
37. IOWA CODE §§ 135.28-29 (2009).
38. See id. § 135.29(2) (providing that "the local [SDMB] may act as a substitute decision
maker for patients incapable of making their own medical care decisions if no other substitute
decision maker is available to act"); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-85 (2009).
39. See IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-85.6(1) ("A person shall not participate on a panel for a
case when that person has a conflict of interest."); id. at r. 641-85.2(1) (defining "conflict of
interest" as "a standard which precludes the participation of a panel member in the proceedings
with regard to a patient whenever the panel member is a relative of the patient, is a direct care
provider of the patient or has a financial interest in the patient").
40. See id. at r. 641-85.3 to .6, 641-85.8 to .12.
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SMDBs only come into play when there is no surrogate available, 41
their concept can be adapted to resolving futility disputes between
surrogates and healthcare providers in an impartial and humane
manner.
In order to ensure that incompetent patients are adequately
protected as they are nearing the end of life, this Note argues that
states should establish state and local medical decisionmaking boards
to resolve futility disputes. Modeled after the Iowa SMDBs, these
boards would have procedural and substantive requirements that
would prevent improper interests from affecting decisions regarding
medical treatment. Part I of this Note describes the background of
futility dispute resolution. Part II then considers the conflicts of
interests inherent in institutional ethics committees, which many
healthcare institutions, courts, and states have vested with
considerable decisionmaking power. Because of the internal nature of
these committees, they cannot and should not be expected to render
impartial decisions. Thus, Part III proposes that the proper response
to this futility dispute problem lies in creating independent medical
boards that would operate under procedural and substantive
regulations to ensure their impartiality.
I. How ARE FUTILITY DISPUTES RESOLVED?

This Part summarizes the current state of futility dispute
resolution. Part L.A illustrates how healthcare decisions are made on
behalf of incompetent patients. Next, Part I.B describes both the
history and failures of the legislative and judicial treatment of end-oflife disputes. Finally, Part I.C explains the rise of healthcare ethics
committees in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
A. HealthcareDecisionmakingfor Incompetent Patients
In order to fully comprehend a futility dispute scenario, one
must first understand the notion of "competence." 42 Despite the
41. Id. atr. 641-85.1.
42. The terms "competence" and "capacity" are often used interchangeably in discussions of
medical decisionmaking, leading to confusion over the exact meaning of these terms.
Traditionally, the term "incompetent" has been used to describe a judicial determination that an
individual lacks the degree of "capacity" legally required to do a particular task. However, many
state statutes require that physicians make a capacity determination in the clinical setting, and
this determination results in the person being treated as if they had been adjudicated
"incompetent." Instead of dwelling on the technical distinctions between these terms, this Note
will use the word "incompetent" to refer to an individual who lacks decisionmaking capacity to
make a treatment decision, whether this determination is made in a judicial or clinical setting.
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importance of this concept in medical decisionmaking, courts often fail
to provide specific guidance on determining competence. 43
Nevertheless, scholarly writing and judicial decisions have established
a general standard: a person is competent for purposes of medical
decisionmaking when she can (1) understand the consequences of
accepting or rejecting a particular treatment, (2) comprehend the
benefits and risks of the treatment and alternatives to the proposed
treatment, and (3) communicate that decision to another.44 Adults are
generally presumed to be legally competent to make treatment
decisions, so healthcare providers may assume that the patient has
capacity to make treatment decisions unless there is reason to
question this presumption. 45 When a patient lacks decisionmaking
capacity, as determined judicially or clinically, someone else must
make the decision on the patient's behalf.4 6 Legislatures have
responded to the problem of determining who will make these medical
decisions in two ways: (1) by recognizing advance directives and (2) by
enacting surrogacy statutes. Under either approach, however, futility
disputes remain an ever-present concern.
1. The Promise and Pitfalls of Advance Directives
An individual can ensure that her wishes will be upheld by
completing an advance healthcare directive. 47 Advance healthcare
directives are "personal contingency plan[s]" regarding how medical
decisions are to be made in the event of decisional or communicative

See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 10, § 3.05 (citing the more widespread usage of
"competence" and "incompetence" due to their simplicity as well as the potential for confusing
"capacity" with a patient's health status). For example, a patient may be physically incapacitated
but still possess decision making capacity.
43. Id.; see, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1233 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (noting that
the trial court decision did not include a clear-cut decision that the patient lacked the requisite
legal competence). This omission may occur because in many end-of-life cases, the patient's
incompetence is undisputable (e.g. the patient is comatose or in a vegetative state). MEISEL &
CERMINARA, supra note 10, § 3.06.
44. Cohen, supra note 21, § 18.02. For decisions using this standard or a close variation, see
In re Martin, 504 N.W.2d 917, 924 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), In re Hier, 464 N.E.2d 959, 965 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1984), and State Dep't of Human Res. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197, 209 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1978).
45. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1812(b) (2009); Saunders v. State, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 516
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) ("Competency is presumed as the normal condition of a person until the
contrary is shown."); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980) (competency presumed even for
psychiatric patients).
46. Cohen, supra note 21, § 18.04[1].
47. CAROL KROHM & ScoTT SUMMERS, ADVANCE HEALTHCARE DIRECTIVES xix (4th ed.
2002).
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incapacity. 48 There are two types of healthcare directives. A treatment
directive, commonly known as a living will, provides direct
instructions to doctors about end-of-life care. 49 A proxy directive, often
referred to as a "durable healthcare power of attorney," names an
agent to make medical decisions on a patient's behalf if the patient
becomes incompetent.50 Not only have most courts encouraged the use
of advance directives, but every state also has legislation authorizing
physicians to follow directives without fear of liability.51 Moreover,
Congress enacted the Patient Self-Determination Act of 1991, which
requires that hospitals and other healthcare organizations notify
patients of their right to make a directive. 52
Despite several decades
of statutory and judicial
endorsement, 53 these instruments have been largely unsuccessful.
Research indicates that less than 25 percent of individuals enact
advance directives.54 Many experts blame these results on a patient's
preference of leaving end-of-life decisions to family members, the
difficulty of executing a legal document, or a patient's denial that
conditions could worsen such that an advance directive is needed.55
Congress has introduced recent legislation to help address these
problems. For example, the Senior Navigation and Planning Act would
require hospitals to include end-of-life planning as part of patient
discharge.56 In addition, the Life Sustaining Treatment Preferences
Act would allow Medicare to reimburse physicians who consult
patients on decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment.5 7 Finally,
the Advance Planning and Compassionate Care Act would establish a
consumer hotline and a national clearinghouse on advance-care
planning and offer state grants to educate the public on the topic. 5 8
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.

51. Rebecca Dresser, Precommitment: A Misguided Strategy for Securing Death with
Dignity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1823, 1828-29 (2003).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(a)(1)(Q), (f) (2008).
53. Dresser, supra note 51, at 1828-29.
54. See Dallas M. High, Advance Directives and the Elderly, 33 GERONTOLOGIST 342, 34248 (1993) (finding that between 0 to 20 percent of elders had completed an advance directive);

Joan M. Teno et al., Do Advance Directives Provide Instructions that Direct Care?, 45 J. AM.
GERIATRICS SOC'Y 508, 509 (1997) (citing a comprehensive study of 4,804 hospitalized, seriously
ill patients during the two years after the PSDA was enacted, which revealed that only 14
percent of the patients had an advance directive in their medical record).

55. Victor G. Cicirelli, Healthy Elders' Early Decisions for End-of-Life Living and Dying, in
20 ANN.
56.
57.
58.

REV. GERONTOLOGY & GERIATRICS 163, 181 (2000).
S. 1263, 111th Cong. (2009).
H.R. 1898, 111th Cong. (2009).
S. 1150, 111th Cong. (2009).
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Although efforts to facilitate advance healthcare planning may
help eliminate uncertainty when a patient becomes incompetent, these
instructions cannot realistically address all issues that will arise
regarding future treatment.6 9 As one physician explained, "Medical
crises cannot be predicted in detail, making most prior instructions
difficult to adapt, irrelevant, or even misleading."60 For instance, a
treatment directive may provide that the patient does not want lifesustaining treatment if the patient is "terminally ill and there is no
hope of recovery," but a debate may arise as to whether this condition
is met. 61 Similarly, a decisionmaker appointed through a proxy
directive may have difficulty making end-of-life decisions if the patient
verbally communicated vague instructions or failed to express her
wishes clearly.
2. Delegating Decisionmaking through Surrogacy Statutes
Recognizing the infrequent execution and inherent limitations
of advance directives, twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia
have statutory surrogate laws. 6 2 These laws authorize certain
individuals to make treatment decisions on behalf of incompetent
patients who have not left written instructions. 63 Many surrogacy laws
provide a hierarchy of the patient's family members from which to
select a surrogate. 64
59. See KENNETH A. FISHER, IN DEFIANCE OF DEATH: EXPOSING THE REAL COSTS OF END-OFLIFE CARE 13 (2008) (explaining that the concept of advance directives is inherently problematic
because it presupposes more control over future treatment than is realistic).
60. Id. (quoting Dr. Henry S. Perkins).
61. Diane E. Hoffmann, Mediating Life and Death Decisions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 821, 831
(1994).
62. CLAIRE C. OBADE, PATIENT CARE DECISIONMAKING: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR PROVIDERS §
11.3 (current through Dec. 2008). These are also referred to as family decisionmaking laws. Id.
See also KROHM & SUMMERS, supra note 47, at 136 (stating that a majority of states have
enacted surrogacy statutes).
63. OBADE, supra note 62, § 11.3.
64. KROHM & SUMMERS, supra note 47, at 136. For example, the Uniform Healthcare
Decisions Act (discussed infra Part I.B.1) provides that consideration may be given, in order of
descending preference to the patient's (1) spouse, unless legally separated; (2) adult child; (3)
parent; or (4) adult sibling. If none of these individuals are reasonably available, an "adult who
has exhibited special care and concern for the patient, who is familiar with the patient's personal
value" may act as surrogate. UNIF. HEALTHCARE DECISIONS ACT § 5(b)-(c), 9 U.L.A. 93 (1993),
reprinted in 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 83 (2006) [hereinafter "UHCDA"].
In general, judicial proceedings are not required to determine incompetence and to appoint a
surrogate. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 10, § 3.16. If a patient is judicially determined to be
incompetent to make medical decisions, the court appoints a guardian who is empowered to
make decisions about the patient's medical care. Id. § 3.10. Alternatively, if a patient is clinically
determined to lack decisionmaking capacity, the designation of a surrogate usually occurs in the
clinical setting without recourse to judicial proceedings. Id.
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Most of these laws provide a general framework within which
surrogates should make decisions on behalf of incompetent patients.
Under the substituted-judgment standard, surrogates should attempt
to determine what the patient would have decided about a specific
medical treatment from any evidence indicating the wishes of the
patient before she lost capacity. 65 If the patient's intent is not evident,
the surrogate should then turn to the "best interest" standard, under
which the surrogate objectively determines the course of treatment
that is in the best interest of the patient.66 Even if a surrogate carries
out this mode of analysis in good faith, the surrogate's conclusion can
conflict with the physician's recommendation regarding the
appropriate course of treatment. Such a futility dispute highlights the
need for a comprehensive, clear, and unbiased framework for resolving
futility disputes that will balance the rights of both the patient and
the physician.
B. Insufficient Legislative and JudicialApproaches to Resolving
Futility Disputes
1. Vague State Legislation Regarding End-of-Life Decisionmaking
While every state authorizes some form of advance healthcare
directive and a majority of states allow surrogates to make medical
decisions on behalf of incompetent patients, these statutes have
resulted in a fragmented and incomplete set of rules governing
healthcare decisionmaking. 67 In response, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Health
Care Decisions Act ("UHCDA" or "the Act") in 1993, which has now
been adopted in eight states. 68 Although the Act is intended to address
65. Matthew Bierlein, Seeing the Face of the Patient: Considerations in Applying Bioethics
Mediation to Non-Competent End-of-Life Decisionmaking,23 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 61, 66
(2007).
66. Id.
67. UHCDA, supranote 64, at prefatory note TT 1-2.
68. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 10, § 7.04[A]. Two other states have modeled
legislation after this. See Pope, supra note 19, at 53 n.294 (noting that the legislative history of
California and Tennessee statutes confirms that the statutes were largely derived from the
UHCDA) (citing Healthcare Decisions for Adults Without Decisionmaking Capacity, Bill Analysis
of A.B. 891 Before the Assem. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong., at 5 (Apr. 15, 1999) (noting
that the bill is "[d]rawing heavily on the [UHCDA]"); Healthcare Decisions: Durable Power of
Attorney, Bill Analysis ofA.B. 891 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,106th Cong., at 2 (July
13, 1999) ("The provisions of the proposed Healthcare Decisions Law (HCDL) are drawn heavily
from the Uniform Healthcare Decisions Act (1993), and implement major parts of the
Commission's recommendation[s]."); Charles M. Key & Gary D. Miller, The Tennessee Healthcare
Decisions Act A Major Advance in the Law of CriticalCare Decision Making, 40 TENN. B.J. 25, 28
(2004).
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procedural aspects of all medical decisionmaking for incompetent
patients and supplant existing state-specific laws,6 9 it fails to provide
a clear and effective futility dispute resolution procedure. The UHCDA
generally provides that a "health-care provider or institution may
decline to comply with an individual instruction or health-care
decision that requires medically ineffective healthcare."7 0 In addition,
the statute attempts to carve out a procedure for resolving futility
disputes that, if followed by the healthcare provider or institution, will
result in civil and criminal immunity.7 1 First, a healthcare provider or
institution must communicate its desire to withdraw treatment to the
surrogate. 72 Then, the healthcare provider or institution must make
"all reasonable efforts" to assist in the transfer of the patient to
another facility that is willing to comply with the surrogate's
request.7 3 Meanwhile, life-sustaining treatment must be continued
until a transfer can be affected."7 4
Although a step forward in providing structured guidance in
resolving futility disputes, the UHCDA fails to answer three major
questions: (1) Who, practically, has the authority to make the final
decision to withdraw treatment? (2) What should a healthcare
provider or institution do if no other institution is willing to admit the
patient and to comply with the surrogate's request? (3) Can a
healthcare provider or institution face liability for forgoing treatment
after determining that treatment is "medically ineffective"?
First, regarding who has the authority to render the final
decision, the UHCDA authorizes the healthcare provider or institution
to withdraw treatment when it is deemed medically ineffective.7 5 Yet
the Act fails to adequately define the specific individual or group of
individuals who should make this determination. The UHCDA defines
"health-care provider" as "an individual licensed, certified, or
otherwise authorized or permitted by law to provide health care in the
ordinary course of business or practice of a profession."7 6 It further
defines "health-care institution" to mean "an institution, facility, or

agency licensed, certified, or otherwise authorized or permitted by law

69. UHCDA, supra note 64, at prefatory note 1 4.
70. Id. § 7(f).
71. Id. §§ 7(g), 9(a).
72. Id. § 7(g).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Pope, supra note 19, at 53 (labeling statutes that include similar provisions as
"Unilateral Decision Statutes" that permit healthcare providers to unilaterally refuse to provide
life-sustaining treatment that they consider to be medically inappropriate).
76. UHCDA, supra note 64, § (1)(8).
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to provide health care in the ordinary course of business."77 Thus the
Act appears not only to authorize any physician treating the patient to
withdraw treatment unilaterally; it also vests similar authority in any
representative of the institution treating the patient. Such
responsibility to forgo treatment, thus ending the life of an
incompetent patient in opposition to the surrogate's decision, should
not be left up to one individual. Moreover, it certainly should not be
made by just any representative of a healthcare institution (i.e.,
anyone who is involved in the provision of medical care). Nonetheless,
faced with this ambiguity, healthcare institutions alone determine
who should hold the ultimate decisionmaking authority to continue or
withdraw life-sustaining treatment.
Second, in addition to not identifying the ultimate
decisionmaker, the Act does not provide a procedure for forgoing lifesustaining treatment against the wishes of the surrogate. The Act
provides that a healthcare provider or institution that declines to
comply with a healthcare decision must make "all reasonable efforts"
to assist in the transfer of the patient to another facility willing to
comply with the instruction.78 It further states that such healthcare
provider or institution must "provide continuing care to the patient
until a transfer can be effected."79 Although the former provision
appears to allow a provider to decline a surrogate's request after
reasonable efforts fail to produce another hospital willing to comply,
this interpretation conflicts with the mandate requiring continued
care until a transfer takes place.80 Therefore, the Act fails to provide
clear instructions for a situation in which no other healthcare facility
is willing to comply with the surrogate's request.8 '
77. Id. §(1)(7).
78. Id. §7(g)(3).
79. Id. § 7(g)(2). It should also be noted that the Act fails to provide the meaning of
"continuing care." See id. § 1 (providing a list of definitions applicable to the Act, but omitting
"continuing care"). Therefore, it is unclear whether it requires institutions to provide only
palliative care or instead more generally requires continued medical care, including lifesustaining treatment, until a patient is transferred. California has addressed this problem by
providing that the obligation of the declining facility to provide continuing care does not mean
unlimited compliance with the patient request but only that the facility continue pain relief and
other palliative care. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4735-36 (West 2009) (providing that a healthcare
provider or institution may decline to comply with an individual healthcare instruction when the
requested care would be ineffective, but that"[i]n all cases, appropriate pain relief and other
palliative care shall be continued").
80. Compare UHCDA, supra note 64, § 7(g)(3), with id. § 7(g)(2).
81. The one state statute that does provide a specific extrajudicial process and definite
timetable for terminating a patient's life-sustaining treatment is the Texas Advance Directives

Act. See Cynthia S. Marietta, The Debate Over the Fate of the Texas "Futile-Care"Law, HEALTH
www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives
L. PERSP., Apr. 25, 2007, at 1, available at
/2007/(CM)TXFutileCare.pdf. The Act authorizes a physician to refuse to honor a surrogate's
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Finally, the UHCDA does not address whether a physician or
healthcare institution could be held liable for forgoing treatment
against the surrogate's wishes. 82 The Act generally exempts from
liability healthcare providers acting in good faith and in accordance
with generally accepted healthcare standards when they (1) comply
with a healthcare decision of a person apparently having authority to
make a decision for a patient, (2) decline to comply with the decision of
a person based on a belief that the person lacks authority, or (3)
comply with a healthcare directive and assume that the directive was
valid when made and has not been revoked or terminated.83 However,
the Act does not explicitly provide protection from liability to a
provider or institution declining to provide life-sustaining treatment
as authorized by the Act.8 4 As will be discussed in Part II.A.3, the
potential for liability left possible by the UHCDA is likely to lead
physicians to continue ineffective treatment in order to avoid the risk
of a lawsuit.86

decision to continue life-sustaining treatment if the physician believes the continued treatment
would be medically hopeless or futile. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (Vernon
Supp. 2009). However, a hospital ethics committee must first review this decision. Id. §
106.046(a). If the committee agrees with the physician and determines that the case is futile, the
patient's family then has ten days to transfer the patient to a facility willing to continue the
treatment. Id. §§ 166.046 (d)-(e). During the ten day waiting period, treatment is continued but
the hospital has no obligation to continue treatment after ten days. Id. The patient's family or
surrogate may seek court intervention to extend the waiting period; however, a court must find
by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a reasonable expectation that another facility
will honor the surrogate's decision in order to grant the extension. Id. § 166.046(g).
82. By synthesizing two sections of the UHCDA, it may be possible to argue that the Act
grants immunity to a healthcare provider or institution that, in good faith and in accordance
with generally accepted healthcare standards, relies on a healthcare provider's decision to forgo
"medically ineffective" treatment. Section 9(a)(1) provides that "[a] healthcare provider or
institution acting in good faith and in accordance with generally accepted healthcare standards
applicable to the healthcare provider or institution is not subject to civil or criminal liability or to
discipline for unprofessional conduct for . . . complying with a healthcare decision of a person
apparently having authority to make a healthcare decision for a patient, including a decision to
withhold or withdraw healthcare." UHCDA, supra note 64, §9(a)(1). The healthcare decision
upon which a healthcare provider may rely may be the provider's authority to decline to comply
with an individual instruction requiring "medically ineffective healthcare," which is authorized
by § 7(f). Id. § 7(f). However, this interpretation is a stretch and is certainly not clear from the
statute.
83. Id. § 9.
84. See David M. English, The Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act and Its Progress in the
States, 15 PROB. & PROP., May/June 2001, at 19, 23 available at http://www.abanet.org/rppt/
publications/magazine/2001/Olmj/Olmjenglish.html (highlighting this omission). California,
Delaware and New Mexico have tried to fix this gap in the immunities section of the UHCDA by
providing protection from liability to a provider or institution declining to provide care as
authorized by the Act. Id.
85. See infra Part II.A.3.

506

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2:491

This problem is illustrated by the results of a recent study of
ethics consultations at the University of California San Diego Medical
Center.8 6 The co-chair of the commission conducting the study
explained that
[tihe nearly universal consensus has been that when faced with cases where physicians
have determined treatment is non-beneficial, but the patient or surrogate continues to
insist on treatment, most physicians continue treatment. Physicians tend to default to
continuation of treatment even if their institution's policies support withdrawal of nonbeneficial treatment. 8 7

Significantly, these findings came from a hospital in California, a
state that has adopted a close version of the UHCDA.8 8
Those states that have not adopted statutes similar to the
UHCDA provide even less guidance on healthcare decisionmaking. For
example, many states generally authorize healthcare providers to
decline to comply with treatment requests that are "outside of their
professional medical judgment" or "contrary to reasonable medical
standards." 89 Alternatively, a few states have enacted narrower
statutes that permit providers to refuse surrogate requests to continue
treatment under very limited circumstances.9 0 For example, when a
futility dispute arises in New York, the provider is authorized to
refuse to provide cardiopulmonary resuscitation-but not other types
of treatment.9 ' Other states authorize healthcare providers to refuse
to provide life-sustaining treatment only when no other decisionmaker
is available. 92 In sum, the UHCDA and the less-comprehensive state
statutes have failed to provide a clear and effective procedure for
resolving futility disputes.

86. Lynette Cederquist, Model Policy on Non-Beneficial Treatment, SAN DIEGO PHYSICIAN,
July 2009, at 22, 23.
87. Id.
88. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4600-4805 (West 2009) ("Many provisions in Parts 1, 2, and 3
are the same as or drawn from the Uniform Healthcare Decisions Act (1993).").
89. Variations of this standard include provisions that authorize providers to refuse to
comply with requests not considered to be "reasonable medical practice," e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §
145B.13 (West 2005), or "within the bounds of responsible medical practice," N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 137-J:7(I) (Supp. 2009).
90. Pope, supranote 19, at 64-65.
91. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2966(1) (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2009). For examples of
similarly limited statutes, see VT. STAT. ANN tit. 18, § 9708(a) (Supp. 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN §
16-30C-6(e) (LexisNexis 2006).
92. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.580 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1107(1) (1993) (repealed
2007) (current version at UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-115 (Supp. 2009)).
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2. Inconsistency and Reluctance in the Judicial Resolution of
Futility Disputes
Compared to traditional end-of-life disputes (in which
surrogates desire to withhold treatment against the provider's
wishes), futility disputes rarely make it to court. 93 This is likely
because court proceedings are time-consuming, highly emotional,
public, and financially costly for both surrogates and healthcare
providers. 94 When a futility dispute does come before a court, the court
will apply the substituted-judgment and best-interest standards, as a
surrogate is required to do by many state laws.9 5 But the judiciary has
struggled to apply these standards consistently. 96 For example, courts
have had difficulty deciding what type of evidence may be considered
in determining the patient's substituted judgment, and they have also
struggled with appropriately weighing the opinions of different family
members.9 7 Furthermore, courts have not established the sufficient
evidentiary burden to decide what the patient would have chosen. 98
The lack of a consistent judicial approach underscores a
conclusion that judges themselves acknowledge: courts are not an
adequate forum for resolving futility disputes.9 9 Numerous judges
have expressed discomfort at being placed in such a role and have

93. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 10, § 13.01.
94. Cohen, supra note 21, § 18.06.
95. Hoffmann, supra note 61, at 840.
96. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hafemeister & Donna M. Robinson, The Views of the Judiciary
Regarding Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment Decisions, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 189, 191,
212-21 (1994) (presenting the results of a survey in which judges described particular difficulty
in reconciling conflicting second-hand information about past patient preference, family wishes,
and disputed medical evidence particularly in light of uncertain decisional standards); see also J.
DONALD SMITH, RIGHT-TO-DIE POLICIES IN THE AMERICAN STATES 169 (2002) (explaining that the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has applied a case-by-case approach in treatment refusal
cases by limiting its holdings to the specific facts, thus providing healthcare professionals with
very little guidance).
97. Hoffmann, supra note 61, at 840 n.81 ("At the trial court level, judges seem to have had
particular difficulty in (1) evaluating prior statements of the patient; (2) evaluating the
testimony of witnesses reporting prior statements of the patient; (3) deciding what weight to give
the opinions of family and friends of the patient; and (4) determining whether the patient's
expressed choice had been altered by time or intervening events.").
98. Cohen, supra note 21, § 18.04[2][a]. While many courts require "clear and convincing
evidence" that the requested treatment constitutes the "substituted judgment" of the patient, the
relationship between the substituted judgment standard and the evidentiary burden of proof is
also unclear in many cases. Id.
99. Id. § 18.06 ("[Slome courts, while recognizing their responsibility to protect individual
rights, have noted that treatment refusal decisions are more appropriately made either in the
physician/patient/family context or through legislature.").
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promoted an alternate form of resolution. 100 For example, one judge
stated, "Because judgment in [life and death cases] involves complex
medical and ethical issues as well as the application of legal
principles, we would urge the establishment-through legislation or
otherwise-of another tribunal to make these decisions. . . ."1o1 Many
other experts echo this sentiment, citing the financial expense, time
commitment, and psychological strain of these cases.102 One need only
look to the recent case of Terri Schiavo to see the inherent problems
with the judicial resolution of these disputes.1 03 The Schiavo case did
not present issues of first impression, yet it involved over forty court
proceedings and took seven years to resolve.104 Given the inconsistency
and reluctance of courts in addressing futility disputes, many medical
and legal scholars recognized the need for an alternative forum. This
recognition led to the development of the institutional ethics
committee.
C. The Emergence and Proliferationof the Ethics Committee
In 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an influential
decision endorsing the creation of ethics committees as an alternative
100. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 678-79 (Ariz. 1987) ("We approach this
case .. . with extreme caution and humility, mindful of the profound and overwhelming sense of
responsibility that accompanies the power to resolve what . . . are all too often life-and-death
issues ... ); Wendland v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595, 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (Raye,
J., concurring) ("I write separately to emphasize the complexity of the life and death issues
underlying this litigation."); In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 15 (Fla. 1990) ("We
are loath to impose a cumbersome legal proceeding at such a delicate time in those many cases
where the patient neither needs nor desires additional protection."); DeGrella v. Elston, 858
S.W.2d 698, 712 (Ky. 1993) (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting) ("It is always a struggle for the
judicial system to properly resolve such weighty questions."); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617,
637 (Nev. 1990) (Springer, J., dissenting) ("I have agonized over this case.").
101. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1264 n.2 (D.C. 1990).
102. Wendy K. Mariner, Decision Making in the Care of Terminally Ill Incompetent Persons:
Concerns About the Role of the Courts, 32 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 739, 742 (1984); David M.
Shelton, Keeping End-of-Life Decisions Away From Courts After Thirty Years of Failure:
Bioethical Mediation as an Alternative for Resolving End-of-Life Disputes, 31 HAMLINE L. REV.
103, 110-13 (2008).
103. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005); see Shelton,
supra note 102, at 105 (calling the Schiavo case "[t]he most recent and well-known example of
the failure of litigation in resolving end-of-life disputes").
104. Cohen, supra note 21, § 18.04. In addition, this case generated legislative activity that
created interesting legal issues about the role of third parties in end-of-life decisionmaking.
Although the early years of the case involved only the patient's family members, the Florida
legislature eventually enacted a statute authorizing the governor to order tube reinsertion. 2003
Fla. Laws ch. 418, invalidated by Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004). This law was
invalidated by the Florida Supreme Court, Schiavo, 885 So. 2d at 337, but then the U.S.
Congress passed a law specifically permitting Schiavo's parents to sue in federal court. Judicial
Relief for the Parents of Theresa M. Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 199 Stat. 15 (2005).
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forum for futility dispute resolution. 05 In In re Quinlin, the court
authorized a father, as guardian of his permanently unconscious
daughter Karen, to request termination of her life-sustaining
treatment. 106 Significantly, the court suggested that as "a general
practice and procedure," ethics committees should confirm the
prognosis of a patient before life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn. 07
Furthermore, it granted civil and criminal immunity for providers who
honored treatment refusals after such ethics committee
involvement. 08 With its holding, In re Quinlin gave credence to a new
alternative to the judicial system in order to clarify proper action for
healthcare providers.
Several states followed New Jersey's lead in recognizing a role
for healthcare ethics committees. 09 Additionally, a 1983 President's
commission report strongly encouraged the creation of ethics
committees to help resolve questions arising at the end of life." 0
Following this development, Maryland and New Jersey mandated the
establishment of ethics committees by law and by regulation,
respectively."' The most important impetus came in 1992, when the
Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
recommended that hospitals establish a mechanism for ethics
consultation.112 Hospitals were certain to heed this recommendation
rather than risk losing accreditation.11 3 By 2007, 81 percent of all
general hospitals and 100 percent of hospitals with more than 400

105. In re Quinlin, 355 A.2d 647, 671 (N.J. 1976), overruled in part on other grounds by In re
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). Quinlin is also significant because it was the first case to
recognize that incompetent patients do not lose the right to reject treatment. Cohen, supra note
21, § 18.04.
106. Quinlin, 355 A.2d at 647.
107. Id. at 667-69.
108. Id.
109. For decisions discussing the role of ethics committees, see Conservatorshipof Wendland,
28 P.3d 151. 155-56 (Cal. 2001); In re Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3, 4-5 (Ga. 1992); In re Lawrance, 579
N.E.2d 32, 42 (Ind. 1991); Woods v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 24, 49-51 (Ky. 2004); In re
Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 208-10, (Mich. 1995).
110. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBS. IN MED. & BIOMEDICAL &
BEHAVIORAL RES., DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND
LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 154-60 (1983), available at http://www.bioethics.gov
/reports/past-commissions/deciding_to_foregotx.pdf.
111. MD. CODE. ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 19-374 (LexisNexis 2009); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 8:4365.1 (2009). Since that time, Colorado and Texas have similarly mandated the establishment of
ethics committees. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18.5-103(6.5) (2008); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 405.60(a)
(2009).
112. Sharon E. Caulfield, HealthcareFacilityEthics Committees, 34 HuM. RTS., Fall 2007, at
10, available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/fall07/caulfifall07.html.
113. Id. at 11.
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beds had established ethics consultation services. 114 Indeed, the
American Medical Association's model approach for resolving futility
disputes includes ethics committee consultation as the final stage of
dispute resolution before an attempt to transfer the patient is made.115
Although ethics committees are generally authorized to make
recommendations, some states have delegated them considerable
decisionmaking power. Several states empower ethics committees to
make life and death decisions jointly with one or two physicians when
no usual surrogate is available.116 Texas has gone a step further by
giving ethics committees the legal authority to render final decisions
in disputes between surrogates and physicians.11 7 Hawaii has
statutorily defined "ethics committee" to include the function of
decisionmaking regarding life-sustaining treatment.118 In New Jersey,
ethics committees are expressly authorized to resolve disputes about
the appropriate interpretation and application of the terms of an
advance directive.119
Even where the authority to render binding decisions is not
granted by state law, ethics committees often serve as the informal
forum of last resort.120 An influential national study of hospital ethics
consultation revealed that, on average, ethics committees
recommended a single best course of action in 46 percent of cases.121
Commentators note that , the institutional force of such
recommendations is so strong that they often become mandatory in

114. Fox et al., supra note 27, at 23.
115. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Medical Futility in End-of-Life

Care:Report of the Council on Ethical and JudicialAffairs, 281(10) J. AM. MED. ASS'N 937, 93940 (1999). In the AMA's "process-based" approach, if a resolution cannot be reached after
consultation with the ethics committee, and transfer cannot be effected, "the intervention ...
need not be provided, although the legal ramifications of this course of action are uncertain." Id.
116. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-11(D)(7) (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231(B) (2009);
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-39-2 (2009); FLA. STAT. § 765.404 (2005 & Supp. 2009).
117. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (Vernon Supp. 2009); see supra note 81
and accompanying text (providing a brief summary of the Texas Advance Directives Act).
118. HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.7(a) (LexisNexis 2007) (defining "ethics committee" as "a
committee that may be an interdisciplinary committee appointed by the administrative staff of a
licensed hospital, whose function is to consult, educate, review, and make decisions regarding
ethical questions, including decisions on life-sustaining therapy").
119. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-53 (West 2007 & Supp. 2009).

120. Sheila A.M. McLean, Clinical Ethics Committees, Due Process and the Right to a Fair
Hearing, 15 J.L. & MED. 1, 1 (2008) (finding that hospital ethics committees in the United States
are "increasingly authoritative"); Sheila A.M. McLean, Clinical Ethics Committees: A Due
Process Wasteland?, 3 CLINICAL ETHICS 100-01 (2008) (describing several court decisions that
cede considerable authority to ethics committee recommendations).
121. Fox et al., supra note 27, at 21.
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effect.122 Moreover, the finality of ethics committee decisions is
especially true in medical futility disputes, which rarely make it to
court. 123 Any decisionmaking body given such tremendous
responsibility to render life-or-death decisions must be impartial and
fair. Yet, as examined in Part II, ethics committees face distinct
conflicts of interests, thus highlighting the need for a different forum
for futility dispute resolution.
II. ETHICS COMMITTEE BIAS CONTAMINATES FUTILITY DISPUTE
RESOLUTION

Many states have not even attempted to address futility
dispute resolution through legislation, instead only allowing
healthcare providers to decline to comply with treatment requests that
are "outside of their professional medical judgment" or "contrary to
reasonable medical standards." 124 Although the UHCDA attempts to
fix this legislative gap, it still fails to provide a clear procedure to
assure that decisions to sustain or forgo treatment will be made in the
best interest of the patient. Faced with these gaps in legislation and
the judiciary's reluctance to resolve futility disputes, many healthcare
institutions have adopted policies that authorize ethics committees to
resolve futility disputes. 125
Despite this degree of influence over life-and-death decisions,
ethics committees operate without any internal or external
regulations. 26 This lack of regulations is particularly problematic in
light of the inherent conflicts of interest within ethics committees.
Healthcare institutions undoubtedly have an interest in the resolution
of end-of-life disputes because the final decision may lead to adverse
financial, legal, and reputational consequences. Such considerations
may inappropriately influence ethics committee decisions because the

122. George Agich, Authority in Ethics Consultation, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 273, 275 (1995)
(recommendations have a "practical effect akin to power"); Karen Ritchie, VWhen It's Not
Optional, 18 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 25, 25 (1988) (describing some ethics committee
recommendations as being mandatory in effect and explaining that committees "may,
intentionally or not, place a great deal of pressure on caregivers to conform to 'optional'
committee determinations"); Susan M. Wolf, Due Process in Ethics Committee Case Review, 4(2)
H.E.C. FORUM 83, 88 (1992) (noting that "committees, even when they protest that they are
merely advisory, can actually wield significant power").
123. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 10, § 13.01.
124. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.

125. Susan Carhart, Process Approach to End-of-Life Care Fails to Eliminate Ethical,
PoliticalIssues, 11 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1755 (Dec. 19, 2002).
126. Spielman, supranote 33, at 180.
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majority of committee members are employed by the institution.127 As
one law professor states, "One need only ask who hires them, who they
are accountable to, and what group they wish least to offend to
appreciate how easily ethics consultants can lose the critical distance
needed to exercise . . . independent, objective judgment." 128
The risk of bias is present in all end-of-life decisions; however,
this Note focuses specifically on the presence of this risk in futility
disputes. Depending on the primary considerations of the specific
ethics committee, conflicts of interest can make ethics committees
biased toward a physician in a futility dispute (resulting in a decision
to inappropriately withdraw treatment) or toward the surrogate
(resulting in the prolonging of treatment even though it is futile). In
other words, an ethics committee's ties to the healthcare institution
create improper considerations that can bias the final decision in
either direction in futility disputes.1 29 This Part will describe multiple
ways in which such improper considerations may contaminate ethics
committee decisions.
A. FinancialConflicts of Interest Lead to the
Improper Considerationof Cost
1. Limiting Expenses by Limiting Treatment
When deciding whether to continue providing life-sustaining
treatment, an ethics committee may be tempted to consider whether
the financial costs of providing such treatment are covered by
Medicare. As the largest public program for financing individuals'
healthcare, Medicare covers inpatient services for persons sixty-five
and over "who receive old-age benefits under Social Security or the
railroad retirement system-nearly the entire elderly population." 130
Under the current payment system, Medicare reimburses hospitals
based on calculations of the average cost of treatment for any

127. See Hoffmann, Regulating Ethics Committees, supra note 30, at 847 (noting the strong
concern that ethics committee decisions will exhibit "institutional protectionism" because
generally the committees are "composed almost entirely of ... staff).
128. Hoffman, Does Legislating Hospital Ethics Committees Make Sense?, supra note 30, at
185 (citing Giles R. Scofield, Ethics Consultation: The Least DangerousProfession?, 2 CAMBRIDGE
Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 417, 420 (1993)).
129. Furthermore, the sources of bias discussed in this Part can affect futility determinations
generally, whether or not the surrogate disputes a physician's decision to withdraw treatment. In
other words, the effects of ethics committee conflicts of interest extend further than futility
disputes between a physician and surrogate, as they can influence a physician's actions even if
not challenged by the surrogate.
130. HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 12, at 110.
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particular diagnosis.131 This prospective payment system, instituted in
1983, completely transformed healthcare reimbursement; 13 2 before
then, Medicare retrospectively reimbursed physicians and healthcare
institutions according to what they charged.133 Under the current
system, institutions receive a set fee for the treatment of patients in
the same diagnosis-related groups ("DRGs"). 34 A DRG is a grouping of
comparable types of patients and illnesses whose cost of treatment is
expected to be similar.135
Although Congress created the prospective payment system in
order to promote more cost-efficient management of medical care,136
the system creates new ways for hospitals to behave opportunistically
and to maximize revenue.137 In the end-of-life context, the prospective
system creates an incentive for physicians and hospitals to limit
treatment and transfer patients quickly and efficiently. 138 When a
patient has exhausted the payment received for her DRG, continuing
treatment results in a net loss for the institution. A healthcare
provider or institution may be more likely to insist upon the
withdrawal of treatment if Medicare payments have been exhausted.
Upon review of this decision, ethics committee members may be more
inclined to discontinue treatment due to these fiscal concerns.139
Rideout v. Hershey Medical Center demonstrates the influence
that insurance payments may have on ethics committee decisions. 40
This case involved Brianne Rideout, a three-year-old diagnosed with a
brain stem glioblastoma that manifested as a malignant tumor in her
brain.141 After undergoing surgery, her physicians determined that her
illness was incurable and that further life-sustaining treatment would
be futile.142 On May 20, 1992, the hospital's social services department
131. Medicare
Prospective
Payment
System,
http://www.ahd.com/pps.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
132. Id.

American

Hospital

Directory,

133. John Lantos, When ParentsRequest Seemingly Futile Treatment for Their Children, 73
MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 587, 589 (May 2006).
134. Id.
135. Doctors Hosp., Inc. of Plantation v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 1448, 1449-50 (11th Cir. 1987).
Each DRG is assigned a weight that varies with the severity of the illness. This number is then
multiplied by a dollar figure that represents the national average per patient cost of medical
treatment. Id.
136. Id.
137. HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 12, at 232.
138. Lantos, supra note 133, at 589.
139. Id.
140. 30 Pa. D. & C.4th 57 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1995); see also Frank Bruni, A Fight Over Baby's
Dignity and Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1996, at A6 (recounting the facts of the case).
141. 30 Pa. D. & C.4th at 59.
142. Id. at 59-60.
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informed Brianne's parents that her health insurance coverage would
soon be exhausted.143 The very next day, Brianne's attending
physician convened the hospital's ethics committee, which decided
that a "Do Not Resuscitate" order would be instituted in the event of
cardiac arrest.144 Brianne's parents reacted with vehement opposition
and desperation, pleading with the physicians and eventually seeking
legal assistance to prevent the cessation of treatment.145 Nevertheless,
the physician and hospital ethics committee decided to remove
Brianne's ventilator against her parents' fervent opposition. 146
The ethics committee may have correctly assessed the futility
of Brianne's situation;147 however, the important point here is that the
exhaustion of insurance payments appeared to factor prominently into
the decision. First, Brianne's physician consulted the ethics committee
the very day after insurance was exhausted. Second, the exhaustion of
insurance payments seemingly led the provider to rush
inappropriately into a decision to withdraw life support. Indeed, the
physician removed Brianne from ventilator support while her mother
was in another area of the hospital on the phone with her lawyer-an
action that the court characterized as sufficient to allege reckless
indifference.1 4 8 Brianne's mother drew attention to the apparent
influence of monetary concerns by stating, "It's okay for some people
who don't regard life and may want their child dead for insurance, but
we value Brianne and her life." 49 Even if the withdrawal of insurance
was not a factor, the appearance of such an improper influence on
ethics committee decisions can be just as damaging to their
legitimacy.
Some may respond that economic factors must be considered in
healthcare decisions because the resources of medical institutions are
limited. However, the legal framework for making healthcare
decisions on behalf of incompetent patients does not include monetary
considerations as a relevant factor. Both surrogate decisionmakers
and courts first apply the substituted-judgment standard, which seeks
to ascertain what the patient would have decided about a specific
medical treatment before she lost capacity.150 If the patient's intent is
143. Id. at 60.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 60-63.
146. Id. at 62-63.
147. Id. at 69 ("[Tlhe hospital's decision to remove the ventilator support may have been a
reasoned medical decision.' ").
148. Id. at 95-96.
149. Id. at 61.
150. See supra note 98.
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not evident, the decisionmaker then applies the "best interest"
standard, under which the course of treatment in the best interest of
the patient is determined.15 ' Both of these tests are patient-centered,
focusing on the preferences, benefits, and burdens on the patient and
excluding considerations such as economic impact on third parties.
This decisionmaking framework should be maintained regardless
of the entity rendering an end-of-life decision on behalf of incompetent
patients.
2. Generating Revenue through Insurance Payments
While the prospective payment system incentivizes hospitals to
limit treatment, other healthcare institutions participating in
retrospective reimbursement may instead continue life-sustaining
treatment in order to increase profit, even though such treatment is
not in the patient's best interest. Even though acute-care hospitals
have transitioned to the prospective payment system, Medicare
retrospectively reimburses certain institutions (including psychiatric,
rehabilitation, children's, and long-term hospitals and home health
agencies) for the reasonable costs of services, determined after the
provision of care.152 This type of reimbursement creates disincentives
for cost containment by providers, 153 possibly resulting in the
continuation of futile treatment.
Additionally, states may retrospectively reimburse medical
facilities through Medicaid, the major federal entitlement program
intended to meet the medical needs of low-income individuals.154
Federal law does not set specific guidelines for Medicaid
reimbursement, instead leaving discretion to the states.155 The
potential for Medicaid reimbursement to impact futility cases is
heightened by the program's coverage of nursing home care.156 Faced
with heavy medical expenses not covered by Medicare, many older
persons use up their assets and become eligible for Medicaid.15 7
Largely as a result of this trend, over 50 percent of nursing home

151. Id.
152. HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 12, at 227.
153. Id. at 226.
154. Id. at 113.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(30)(A) (2006) (requiring states to "assure that payments are
consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough
providers so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such
care and services are available to the general population in the geographic area").
156. HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 12, at 115.
157. Id.
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patients are supported by state Medicaid programs.158 Moreover,
many for-profit long-term care facilities receive more than 75 percent
of their total revenue from Medicare and Medicaid, amounting to over
$87 billion annually. 15 9 Consequently, for many long-term care
facilities, the bottom line greatly depends on government insurance
payments.
Simply put, ethics committees at healthcare institutions
receiving retrospective reimbursement have a financial incentive to
prolong treatment in order to generate revenue through insurance
payments, regardless of whether such treatment is in the best interest
of the patient. For example, a long-term care facility may receive more
reimbursement for attempting life-sustaining treatment for a patient
in a critical state than for administering palliative care.160 Even if the
treatment will be futile, the facility has little incentive to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment against the wishes of the surrogate in this
scenario. Long-term care institutions, whose operation largely
depends on federal Medicare and Medicaid funds, may be more
heavily influenced by these financial considerations. Consequently,
ethics committee members who have a financial interest in the
medical facility may feel an obligation to take these costs into
consideration when resolving a futility dispute.
Additionally, healthcare institutions may generate revenue by
transferring futile patients from one facility to another during the
course of treatment, a practice that gives rise to unnecessary physical
stress and creates avoidable risks for the patient. This occurs for two
reasons. First, under the Medicare prospective payment system, a
transferring institution will be paid at a per diem rate (up to the full
DRG allowance) based on the average per diem cost to the government
of patients in the same DRG.161 By contrast, the transferee-institution
receives the usual DRG payment in full.1 62 This payment scheme
incentivizes healthcare institutions to admit patients transferred from
other institutions. It is thus unsurprising that public healthcare

158. Id.

159. Carolyn Cartier, From Home to Hospitaland Back Again: Economic Restructuring, End
of Life, and the Gendered Problems of Place-Switching Health Services, 56 Soc. SCI. & MED.
2289, 2293 (2003).
160. See Robert Kaplan & Diane Schneider, Medical Decision Making Toward the End of

Life: Ethical, Economic, and Health Policy Implications, 20 ANN. REV. GERONTOLOGY &
GERIATRICS 39, 576 (2000).
161. HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 12, at 232.
162. Id.
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institutions receive more transfers since the implementation of this
system. 163
Second, hospitals may exploit the prospective payment system
by transferring patients to nursing homes, which in turn transfer the
patient back to the hospital. In this scenario, referred to as the
"revolving door" of healthcare provision,164 a hospital first transfers a
futile-care patient to a nursing home. Later, a physician will readmit
the patient to the hospital with newly documented symptoms in order
to qualify for a new DRG. The transfer of futile-care patients back and
forth from hospitals to nursing homes for complications that solely
prolong the dying process may generate additional income for the
hospital, the physician, and the long-term care facility. Indeed, "[iun a
study of three U.S. west-coast nursing homes, 48% of the residents
who were transferred to an acute-care hospital had conditions that
'could have been definitively diagnosed and treated in the nursing
home.' "'165

Although Medicare has attempted to prevent this abuse
through oversight, 66 the profit incentive and the potential for abuse
will remain if those who profit from the care possess complete
discretion to decide whether such care is futile. When an ethics
committee is faced with a futility dispute and the institution can profit
if the committee sides with the surrogate, then continuing treatment
would appear to be the easy choice for the committee. After all, those
who may be harmed by the decision are unlikely to cause any real
problems in response: the physician depends on the institution for her
livelihood, and the patient cannot speak for herself.
3. Avoiding Litigation
Not only may ethics committees be influenced to continue futile
treatment improperly in order to gain revenue through insurance
payments, but they may also continue treatment to prevent the costs
of litigation. Although numerous experts believe that patient
protection should be the primary purpose of ethics committees, 67
163. Id.
164. Cartier, supra note 159, at 2290.
165. Miriam Moss, End of Life in Nursing Homes, 20 ANN. REV. GERONTOLOGY & GERIATRICS
224, 226-27 (2000) (quoting Jeanie S. Kayser-Jones et al., Factors in Contributing to the
Hospitalizationof Nursing Home Residents, 29 GERONTOLOGIST 502, 509 (1989)).
166. See HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 12, at 232 ("mhe government set up a monitoring
system to investigate transfers to ensure that PPS was not being exploited.").
167. E.g., Robert M. Kliegman et al., In Our Best Interests: Experience and Workings of an
Ethics Review Committee, 108 J. PEDIATRICS 178, 186 (1986) ("[The goal is to promote the best
interests of patients."); Judith Randal, Are Ethics Committees Alive and Well?, HASTINGS CTR.
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many have asserted that risk management is also a valid committee
objective.168 The Supreme Court has supported this role for ethics
committees, explaining that "[t]he committee's function is protective.
It enables the hospital appropriately to be advised that its posture and
activities are in accord with legal requirements."169 In some cases, the
hospital's interest in avoiding potential lawsuits may be inconsistent
with the best interest of the patient.170 Liability concerns may lead
physicians to resort to more aggressive treatment even when such
treatment is futile.171 Ethics committees reviewing treatment
decisions may similarly err on the "safe side" by recommending the
continuation of futile treatment.
Two factors heighten the risk that ethics committees will "overtreat" due to liability concerns. First, the presence of hospital
administrators and attorneys on many ethics committees may
increase the likelihood that risk-management will be .a committee
objective.172 Second, the unequal bargaining power of the surrogate
and the healthcare institution may lead ethics committees to continue
treatment in accordance with the surrogate's wishes. Healthcare
institutions may incur substantial financial and reputational harm
due to litigation, making them risk-averse in futility disputes. By
contrast, surrogates may be more risk-tolerant because the costs of
their decisions are externalized.173 The financial burden is often borne
by the insurer, while the emotional burden of treating the patient is
REP., Dec. 1983, at 10, 12 (characterizing the role of ethics committees as that of patient
advocate).
168. George J. Annas, Ethics Committees in Neonatal Care: Substantive Protection or
ProceduralDiversion?, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 843, 843-44 (1984) ("Institutions and their staffs
often see the primary function of ethics committees as protecting them against potential legal
liability for treating or not treating particular patients.").
169. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973).

170. JUDITH WILSON ROSS ET AL., HANDBOOK FOR HOSPITAL ETHICS COMMITTEES 39 (1986);
John A. Robertson, Committees as Decision Makers: Alternative Structures and Responsibilities,
in INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES AND HEALTHCARE DECISION MAKING 85, 88-89 (Ronald E.

Cranford & A. Edward Doudera eds., 1984) (noting the potential use of an ethics committee as an
"ethical risk management team").
171. HARRIS INTERACTIVE, FEAR OF LITIGATION: THE IMPACT ON MEDICINE 9 (2002), available

at http://commongood.org/attachments/57/Fear+of+Lit+Exec+Rep.pdf (showing that over half of
the respondents stated that they have noticed a physician resorting to aggressive treatments of
terminally ill patients because of liability concerns).
172. ROSS, supra note 170, at 390 n.194 (citing 1992 survey conducted with the assistance of
the American Hospital Association that found that 96.2 percent of all ethics committees contain
at least one administrator and explaining: "The concern that the ethics committee will act as a
risk management team is heightened by the inclusion on nearly all committees of hospital
administrators and in-house counsel, both of whom have probable conflicts of interest.").
173. Thaddeus M. Pope & Ellen A. Waldman, Mediation at the End of Life: Getting Beyond
the Limits of the Talking Cure, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 143, 169 (2007).
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borne by the healthcare provider. 174 The resulting relationship is often
characterized by unequal bargaining power, as risk-tolerant
surrogates have greater leverage than risk-averse institutions. 175
Because the interests of the majority of ethics committee
members are inherently intertwined with the interests of the
healthcare institution, the committee may reflect the institution's risk
aversion. As a result, ethics committees may gloss over difficult cases
to avoid courses of action that could work to the institution's
disadvantage, thus jeopardizing the patient's right to receive
treatment in accordance with her substituted judgment or best
interest. 7 6 At a recent open forum on ethics committees conducted by
the American Medical Association Council on Judicial and Ethical
Affairs, delegates highlighted this problem by asserting that ethics
committees often avoid cases that could pose challenges to the
organization. 7 7 Those committee members who serve riskmanagement functions within the institution, including hospital legal
counsel and administrators, will more strongly advise the committee
to take the position on a case that is least likely to cause legal
problems for the institution.1 7 8
Legislation in ten states grants immunity from civil or criminal
liability to members of ethics committees or healthcare providers who
rely on committee advice; however, this legislation leaves unprotected
the healthcare institution from other claims relating to the physician's
prior decisions in the treatment of the patient. 7 9 If an ethics
committee decides to withdraw life-sustaining treatment against the
surrogate's wishes, the surrogate may perceive the decision as
evidence that the physician did not value the patient's life. This
perception, however irrational, may result in a civil suit for allegedly
negligent acts or omissions occurring prior to the ethics committee
decision. Alternatively, patients may perceive the withdrawal of
treatment as the provider's attempt to "bury a mistake," thus leading
to a malpractice or negligence suit. Because a healthcare institution
174. Id.
175. Id. at 184-85.
176. Cynthia B. Cohen, The Social Transformation of Some American Ethics Committees,
HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 21.
177. Kevin B. O'Reilly, Delegates Weigh Ethics Committee's Role, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 1,
2008, at 17, availableat http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2008/images/prhdl2O1.pdf.
178. Robert F. Weir, PediatricEthics Committees: Ethical Advisers or Legal Watchdogs?, 15
LAw MED & HEALTHCARE 99, 106 (1987).
179. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-11 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231 (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
765.404 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-39-4, 31-39-7 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.7
(LexisNexis 2007); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 19-374 (West 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2201 (2009); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.039, 166.044 (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2009).
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could be joined in these lawsuits and held vicariously liable for a
physician's acts, ethics committees employed by the institution would
be incentivized to side with the surrogate in order to avoid this risk.
Ethics committees may also want to continue treatment to shield the
institution from reputational consequences, which can result even
without litigation. For example, a hospital may attract negative
attention from the public if it withdraws life-sustaining treatment,
especially if the surrounding community holds strong religious views
regarding the end of life.180
In addition, liability considerations may impact ethics
committee decisions in a more subtle way. Consider the following
scenario. During a tonsillectomy, a physician makes a mistake in
administering the anesthetic.181 The patient, a five-year-old boy,
enters into a coma due to hypoxic encephalopathy caused by a lack of
oxygen supply to the brain.182 While the provider recognizes the
futility of continuing life-sustaining treatment, the family insists that
treatment be continued. 183 This futility dispute is appropriate for
ethics committee review, but both the physician and the institution
may wish to delay this case until the expiration of the statute-oflimitations period for malpractice claims.184 Even though a prompt
decision is in the patient's best interest, the ethics committee may
instead seek to shield the physician, the institution, or both from
liability through delay or avoidance. An independent decisionmaking
body lacking any connection to the physician or hospital would not
seek to protect these third parties, but would instead step in to protect
the patient from such injustice.

180. See, e.g., Arthur E. Kopelman, Understanding, Avoiding, and Resolving End-of-Life
Conflicts in the NICU, 73 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 580, 582 (2006) (reproducing a surrogate
decisionmaker's explanation that if he or she "agreed to limit or stop life support, members of
their church would see them as lacking faith in God's ability to heal"); see also Robert L. Fine,

The Texas Advance Directives Act of 1999: Politics and Reality, 13 HEC FORUM 59, 64 (2001)
(explaining that individuals led by the National Right to Life Committee believed that patient
surrogates should have the unlimited right to insist on life-sustaining treatment for the patient).
181. This illustration is modeled after a scenario documented by Kevin Simpson, Anesthesia
Cited in B-N Boy's Death, PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, Ill.), Mar. 16, 1996, at Al. In the real case,
the young boy died soon after the surgery. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-116 (2009) (declaring that the statute of limitations
in medical malpractice actions is one year following the date of the event or incident giving rise
to the injury, or one year from the date of the discovery of the injury).
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B. Professional Conflicts of Interests Create Improper Allegiance
Ethics committees are composed primarily of physicians and
nurses.185 As a result, physicians and other medical staff on the ethics
committee are likely to give added weight to the opinion of the
treating physician and to dismiss the surrogate's position in a futility
dispute more quickly. One physician noted that he has "seen the
concerns of some individuals ignored because they are old, young,
women, or health care personnel other than physicians."8 6 In fact,
committee members may believe that their primary constituency is
the physician, rather than the patient.187 A patient's surrogate who
recognizes the professional relationship between ethics committee
members and the treating physician would be justifiably suspicious of
the committee's neutrality, leading the surrogate not to consult the
committee if she disputes a physician's recommendation to forgo
treatment.188

Moreover, preexisting social and professional relationships
with the treating physician may cause overreliance in the treating
physician's opinion regarding the futility of continuing treatment. 89
This bias may help explain the findings of a national study that
discovered that 87 percent of ethics committees "usually" or "always"
gathered information by examining the patient's record (composed by
the patient's physician), while only 48 percent consulted the patient's
family members.190 In addition to professional relationships, the
institutional process of medical peer review further threatens ethics
committee objectivity. A treating physician involved in a futility
dispute may later participate in peer review of other physicians
185. Fox et al., supra note 27, at 23 (finding that of individuals performing ethics
consultation, 34 percent were physicians and 31 percent were nurses); see also Burns & Truog,
supra note 20, at 1990-91 ("[T]he delicate task of adjudicating futility disputes between families
and [physicians] is done by a group that is virtually indistinguishable from the clinicians
themselves.").
186. SIGRID FRY-REVERE, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF BIOETHICS COMMITTEES AND
CONSULTANTS 100 (1992) (emphasis added).
187. Andrew L. Merritt, The Tort Liability of Hospital Ethics Committees, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.
1239, 1292 (1987) ("It is unlikely that many committees identify whether their primary
constituency is doctors or patients. Indeed, few of the participants may consciously think in
advance of defining their roles in these terms.").
188. See Robert D. Truog, Tackling Medical Futility in Texas, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1, 2
(2007) (recognizing that members of ethics committees are "insiders," and that this is "hardly a
'jury of peers' for a low-income woman of color and her infant son").
189. See Don Milmore, Hospital Ethics Committees: A Survey in Upstate New York, 18 HEC
FORUM 222, 235, 239 (2006) (noting that ethics committees constituted of hospital staff may
exhibit both institutional biases toward 'groupthink' as well as feel an obligation of loyalty that
may color their views of the actions of those with whom they work).
190. Fox et al., supra note 27, at 20.
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serving on an ethics committee. By siding with the surrogate
decisionmaker, ethics committee members risk later retaliation by the
treating physician in peer review. 19 1
Although committee members influenced by professional
connections may be prone to side with the physician in a futility
dispute and thus decide to withdraw treatment, this risk is lessened
by the ethics committee's fear of liability resulting from stopping
treatment. 192 Accordingly, the risk of professional bias is greatest in
jurisdictions granting immunity to ethics committee members.1 93
Empirical research conducted at the Baylor Health Care System in
Texas, a state where ethics committees are immune from liability,
indicates that this risk may be a reality.194 During a two-year period,
Baylor's ethics committee agreed with the clinical team's futility
assessment in forty-three of forty-seven cases.195 This statistic may
signal that internal ethics committees that are immunized from
liability serve merely as a rubber-stamp mechanism for consistently
overriding surrogate requests for maintaining treatment.196
III. A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL FUTILITY DISPUTE
RESOLUTION MECHANISM

The above discussion reveals that both public and private
policies have failed to adequately safeguard incompetent patients in
the midst of a dispute regarding whether to forgo or continue lifesustaining treatment. Most states have not addressed futility disputes
through legislation, and the model act intended to address this issue,
the UHCDA, fails to answer fundamental questions regarding its
procedure. Furthermore, judges have expressed consistently that
courts are not the proper venue for the resolution of futility disputes.
As a result, ethics committees have emerged as an alternative forum,
yet it is a forum plagued by conflicts of interest that can lead to biased
and unfair medical decisions.
Any solution to this legal problem must balance several
competing interests. First, patient autonomy is a fundamental
191. See, e.g., Mildred Z. Solomon et al., Decisions Near the End of Life: Professional Views
on Life-Sustaining Treatments, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 14, 19 (1993) (in which interviewed

respondents expressed discomfort with withdrawing treatments due to fear of sanction by peer
review boards).
192. See supra Part II.A.3.
193. See supra note 179 for a list of states.
194. Robert D. Truog & Christine Mitchell, Futility - From Hospital Policies to State Laws,
AM. J. OF BIOETHICS, Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 19, 19-21.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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principle of American common law. Judge Benjamin Cardozo, then of
the New York Court of Appeals, explained long ago that "[e]very
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body ... . "197 Advance directives and
surrogacy statutes are an effort to protect and extend the autonomy
principle for those not of "sound mind" such as the incompetent,
mentally disabled, or underage. Under most surrogacy statutes, a
surrogate must make medical decisions according to the surrogate's
knowledge of the patient's wishes, to the extent that these are known.
Thus, a physician's disagreement with a surrogate's request for
continued life-sustaining treatment, albeit futile in the physician's
opinion, may be seen as denying respect for patient autonomy.
Yet the law simultaneously embraces the physician's right to
refuse treatment that she deems medically ineffective. 9 8 This right is
well-established among members of the medical field, 9 9 as captured
by the American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics. 200 By
facilitating a surrogate's request for unnecessary or harmful
intervention out of respect for patient autonomy, the physician
reciprocally undermines her own professional autonomy 20 1 as well as
her fiduciary obligation to the patient. 202 Therefore, any solution to
resolving futility disputes must provide a channel for the opinions and
concerns of the competing autonomies of the patient and the physician
to be expressed.
Furthermore, futility dispute resolution must incorporate
elements of procedural due process to ensure that patients' interests
receive adequate protection. 20 3 Although some commentators argue
that due process procedures may make ethics committee case review
unnecessarily adversarial, minimum procedural protections must be
afforded in the context of life-and-death decisions. The existence of

197. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
198. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 10, § 13.01.
199. Cohen, supra note 21, § 18.04[5][b] ("Until the end of the 20th century, there was little
legal or medical dispute over the general proposition that there is no legal obligation to provide
"medically futile" treatment, even if a patient or a patient's surrogate demands the treatment
and can pay for it.").
200. "[P]hysicians are not ethically obligated to deliver care that, in their best professional
judgment, will not have a reasonable chance of benefitting their patients." AM. MED. AsS'N, supra
note 15, §§ 2.035, 2.17, 2.20.
201. Allan S. Brett & Laurence B. McCullough, When Patients Request Specific
Interventions-Definingthe Limits of the Physician's Obligation, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED 1347,
1347-51 (1986).
202. Philip G. Peters, When Physicians Balk at Futile Care, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 798, 841
(1997).
203. Wolf, supra note 35, at 818-19.

524

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2:491

procedural rights in these decisions bolsters confidence in the accuracy
of the decision, permits an orderly and reliable method for fact-finding
and rule application, and symbolizes the parties' rights to have official
acts explained and justified. 204 Due process norms demand that
institutions exercising control over the lives of others, such as ethics
committees, "channel their authority in a way that is morally and
ethically justifiable." 205 In that vein, the Supreme Court has held that
when a jury must decide whether to sentence a criminal defendant to
death, due process requires procedures to protect against arbitrariness
and capriciousness. 206
With these principles in mind, this Note proposes a solution
that provides a clear, statutory procedure for resolving futility
disputes. This solution is adapted from Iowa's innovative
establishment of State and Local Substitute Medical Decision-Making
Boards ("SMDBs"). This Part first discusses the background of the
Iowa SMDB program. It then describes each element of this program
and its application to futility dispute resolution.
A. Background of Iowa Substitute DecisionmakingBoards
In 1989, Iowa enacted legislation establishing the State
Substitute Medical Decision-Making Board and authorizing counties
to establish local substitute medical decisionmaking boards. 207 These
boards were created in order to make medical decisions for
incompetent patients who have no other surrogate decisionmaker
available. 208 Iowa's program expands upon New York's Surrogate
Decision Making Committee Program, 209 which makes decisions for
persons with mental disabilities who reside in state-operated or state-

204. Nora O'Callaghan, Dying for Due Process: The Unconstitutional Medical Futility
Provision of the Texas Advance DirectivesAct, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 527, 561 (2008).
205. Id. at 561-62.
206. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.153, 189 (1976) ("[Wlhere discretion is afforded . . . on a
matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that
discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action.").
207. IOWA CODE § 135.28-29 (2009); SUBSTITUTE DECISION MAKERS TASK FORCE FOR THE
IoWA DEPT. OF ELDER AFFAIRS, ALTERNATIVES TO GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP FOR
ADULTS IN IOWA 14 (2006), available at http://www.state.ia.us/elderaffairs/Documents/
Ombudsman/AlternativesBooklet.pdf.
208. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-85.3(1) (2009).
209. Ronald D. Eckoff, Letter to the Editor, State Plans for Surrogate Decision Making, 272
J. AM. MED. ASS'N 849, 850 (1994) (explaining that the Iowa SMDB's were established "using the
New York rules as a guide").
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licensed facilities. 210 Unlike the New York program, the Iowa SMDBs
may make healthcare decisions for any individual who is medically
incompetent and who does not have a guardian or family members to
make medical decisions. 211 However, they are not authorized to make
decisions regarding the discontinuance of life-sustaining medical
treatment. 212
Even though the Iowa SMDBs are utilized as a substitute
mechanism when surrogates are not available and lack the authority
to make decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment, these
independent boards, along with their requirements and procedures,
provide the ideal mechanism for resolving futility disputes. Therefore,
this Part proposes the establishment of Futility Dispute Resolution
Boards ("FDRBs") by building upon the Iowa program. These policy
provisions would help ensure that those charged with resolving futility
disputes fully consider both positions in the dispute and are not
influenced by the financial, legal, or professional considerations that
currently undermine the neutrality of ethics committee decisions.
Even though this solution is focused on resolving futility disputes, it
could easily be broadened to encompass all end-of-life disputes.
B. Hashing Out the Solution Details
1. Board Structure and Composition
As in Iowa, FDRBs would be structured as a two-tier program
that creates a state board and authorizes each county to establish and
fund a local board. 213 Where there is no local board, the state board
would have jurisdiction. 214 The state board would consist of at least
fifteen members, at least four of whom are licensed as medical doctors
by the state. 215 The two-tier nature of this program will provide the
210. See NY COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 710.1 (2009); Stanley S. Herr & Barbara L.
Hopkins, Healthcare Decision Making for Persons With Disabilities: An Alternative to
Guardianship,271 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1017, 1017 (1994).
211. Eckoff, supra note 209, at 850.
212. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-85.2(5) (2009) (explicitly providing that the board does not
have the authority to make a decision regarding the "discontinuance of medical treatment which
is sustaining life functions").
213. IOWA CODE § 135.28 (2009) ("A state substitute medical decisionmaking board is
established to formulate policy and guidelines for the operations of local substitute medical
decisionmaking boards, and to act if a local substitute medical decisionmaking board does not
exist.").
214. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-85.10.
215. Id. at r. -84.2 ("The state [S1DB] shall consist of 15 members at least 4 of whom shall
be licensed in Iowa as doctors of medicine and surgery or as osteopathic physicians and surgeons,
as defined by law.").

526

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2:491

flexibility needed to ensure participation by counties with varying
amounts of human and financial resources. Some counties might
establish their own boards, which would have the obvious advantage
of local accessibility. However, counties lacking adequate resources
could take advantage of a state board without sacrificing limited
resources. The lack of resources has been cited by rural healthcare
providers as one factor inhibiting the development and maintenance of
institutional ethics committees. 216 Providing institutions access to a
state- or county-funded decisionmaking board would alleviate this
burden. Furthermore, by creating a uniform mechanism of resolving
futility disputes in each state, this program would replace the current
system, in which ethics committees vary in quality and function across
healthcare institutions. 217
In addition, FDRBs would have standard composition
requirements. Each board, whether at the state or local level, would
have at least one member in each of the following categories: (1)
physicians; (2) bioethicists; (3) nurses or social workers; (4)
psychologists or counselors; and (5) other individuals (who do not fall
into the first four categories) with recognized expertise and interest in
persons unable to make their own health decisions. 218 These
guidelines recognize the expertise needed to resolve the complex and
technical medical and ethical issues involved in end-of-life disputes. 219
Courts have cited the lack of medical and ethical expertise in calling
for an alternative forum for resolving these disputes; 220 therefore, such
an alternative forum must consist of individuals with the requisite
training.
In addition to providing expertise, the guidelines would
acknowledge the importance of diversity in a healthcare
decisionmaking body. A nurse's or social worker's perspective likely
216. Ann Cook & Helena Hoas, Are Healthcare Ethics Committees Necessary in Rural
Hospitals?, 11 HEC FORUM 134, 135 (1999).
217. Hoffmann, Regulating Ethics Committees, supra note 30, at 762 ("The 'quality' of ethics
committees is likely to vary considerably. Large teaching hospitals in urban centers, for example,
are much more likely to have the resources and access to individuals with expertise in medical
ethics that are necessary to operate a successful committee, whereas small hospitals and nursing
homes in rural areas may have difficulty finding these ingredients.").
218. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-85.3(1) (requiring local boards to consist of one or more
representatives from each of the following categories: (1) physicians, nurses, or psychologists
licensed by Iowa; (2) attorneys admitted to practice in Iowa or social workers; and (3) "other
individuals with recognized expertise or interest in persons unable to make their own medical
care decisions" not included in the first two categories).
219. The Iowa regulations require diversity but fail to require expertise. Id. Interpreting the

plain meaning of the regulatory text, it appears as though a board could be composed of only a
nurse, a social worker, and a clergyman. Id.
220. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 n.2 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
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would differ from that of a physician on a particular case, given the
nature of their day-to-day interaction with patients and their families.
Furthermore, psychologists or counselors would assist the ethics
committee in understanding the emotional and psychological
dimensions of a futility dispute, and would help to resolve
misunderstandings between surrogate decisionmakers and hospital
staff. Lastly, the final category would give boards the flexibility to
include another individual with valuable expertise or interest in endof-life medical decisions. For example, a chaplain would contribute a
theological perspective, helping the committee to better understand
the religious or spiritual beliefs of the patient, the surrogate, or both,
and the impact of these beliefs on the futility dispute. Placing this
type of composition requirement on each hospital ethics committee
might be unrealistic in areas with fewer resources and limited staffing
levels; 221 however, the FDRB program would allow a county to pool its
resources to meet the standard or, alternatively, use the state's board.
2. Universal Access and Clear Application Procedure
While most hospitals have established ethics committees,
surrogates may be unaware of their presence or may not be granted
access to consultations. 222 Even if they are granted access, surrogates
may feel intimidated by an ethics committee's close ties with the
healthcare institution and the physician treating the patient. As one
commentator explains, committee members are "unavoidably
'insiders,' completely acculturated to the clinical world and its
attendant values. This is hardly a 'jury of peers' for a low-income
woman of color and her infant son." 223 Thus, a board reviewing a
futility dispute must be accessible to any person who has knowledge
and concern of a particular case. 224 In addition to requiring broad
access, hospitals would be required to provide information about the
FDRB program to surrogate decisionmakers, family members, and
hospital staff.
221. Cook & Hoas, supra note 216, at 135; cf. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 8:43G-5.1(h) (2009)
(requiring that hospitals assure participation by individuals with medical, nursing, legal, social
work, and clergy backgrounds in ethics committees).
222. See Fox et al., supra note 27, at 23 (noting a small percentage of hospitals responding to
the survey place restrictions on who could request consultations).
223. Truog, supra note 188, at 1.
224. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-85.4(1) (2009); see Hoffmann, Regulating Ethics Committees,
supra note 30, at 761 ("A likely goal of legislation mandating the establishment of ethics
committees is to provide access for all patients and healthcare providers to a multidisciplinary
group that can provide them with sound advice on ethical dilemmas involved in the treatment of
patients.").
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Furthermore, the application procedure must be clear and
expeditious. Importantly, the application requirements must be
comprehensible by those with and without medical knowledge. 225 The
application thus would include (1) the relationship of the person filing
the application; (2) the patient's preferred course of treatment, if
known, as expressed to the person filing the application; (3) if the
patient's preference is not known, a stated opinion by the applicant of
the treatment decision that is in the best interest of the patient; and
(4) any other information that may be necessary in determining the
appropriate course of treatment, such as a second medical opinion. 226
3. Panel Appointment and Conflicts of Interest
When an application is filed with a state or local FDRB, the
chairperson would appoint a panel to handle the case. 227 The panel
would consist of a minimum of three members, including at least one
member from each category provided in the regulation governing the
composition of boards. 228 Most significantly, an individual would be
prohibited from participating on a panel for a case when that person
has a conflict of interest. 229 A "conflict of interest" is defined as
a standard
regard to a
health care
health care

which precludes participation of a panel member in the proceedings with
patient whenever the panel member is a relative or friend of the patient, is a
provider of the patient, has a professional or personal relationship with the
23 0
provider, or has a direct or indirect financial interest in the patient.

Thus, an employee, officer, director, or owner of the healthcare
institution treating the patient would be prohibited from serving on
the panel resolving a futility dispute. As a result, the panel would not

225. Iowa requires the application to include a written statement by a physician or dentist
describing the proposed medical care, the patient's medical condition, and the risks and benefits
of the proposed care and any alternative treatments (including non-treatment). IOWA ADMIN.
CODE. r. 641-85.4(3)(g). This requirement is not appropriate in the futility context because the
patient's family or surrogate may not be able to meet it.
226. See id. at r. -85.4(3) (including these requirements but adding others that are
inapplicable or unnecessary in the futility dispute context, e.g. a statement that the patient does
not have any family member, guardian, or attorney-in-fact who is reasonably available and
willing to make the medical care decision; the reasons for believing that the patient is medically
incompetent; and a physician's statement).
227. Id. at r. -85.6(1).
228. Id. at r. -85.3, -85.6(1).
229. Id. at r. -85.6(1).
230. IOWA ADMIN. CODE. r. -85.2(1) provides a similar definition of "conflict of interest," but it
does not exclude a friend of the patient, anyone who has a professional or personal relationship
with the healthcare provider, or anyone with an direct or indirect financial interest in the
patient.
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have a financial interest in the decision and would not even be privy to
the monetary considerations of the healthcare institution.
Critics may respond that although panels composed from
FDRBs might not be motivated by the healthcare institution's
financial interest, these governmental bodies would be incentivized to
terminate treatment as a cost-cutting measure. 2 31 In other words,
FDRBs could use their authority as a way of "rationing" end-of-life
care. 232 To the contrary, this mechanism would prevent forms of
rationing used by insurance companies from affecting medical
decisions for the terminally ill. In contrast to institutional ethics
committees in private healthcare institutions, FDRBs would not be
motivated by profit and thus would not be driven by insurance
reimbursement. Additionally, FDRBs would be legally required to
follow substantive decisionmaking criteria, which further ensure that
their decisions remain patient-centered. 2 33 Finally, states have an
indisputable interest in safeguarding the patient's individual right to
make medical decisions at the end of life, as evidenced by advance
directive and surrogacy statutes. States also have an indisputable
interest in the preservation of human life, as demonstrated by the
criminalization of, for example, homicide and euthanasia. 234 Thus,
even more than ethics committees who have a financial interest in the
institution, public officials have an overwhelming interest in
protecting incompetent patients, which cuts in favor of establishing
the FDRB program.
In addition to eliminating financial conflicts of interest,
severing the ties between the dispute resolution mechanism and the
healthcare institution will remove other ethics committee biases.
First, independent medical decisionmaking boards would not be

231. See Sarah Palin, Opinion, Obama and the Bureaucratizationof Healthcare, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 9, 2009, at A23 (claiming that the president's proposals to create an Independent Medicare
Advisory Council and to reimburse doctors for end-of-life counseling would lead to the rationing
of healthcare by "death panels").
232. Id.
233. This includes the requirement that board members may not consider potential financial
costs associated with life-sustaining treatment, including coverage by insurance providers.
234. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985) ("The state's interest in preserving life is
commonly considered the most significant of the four state interests."); see also Cruzan v. Dir.,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) (discussing Missouri's interest in safeguarding the
personal element of the choice between life and death through the imposition of heightened
evidentiary standards and explaining that a state may simply assert an "unqualified interest in
the preservation of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of
the individual").
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Furthermore, board members would not possess the professional bias
that currently may lead ethics committee members to side with the
physician. Even though the physician on the board might still be more
trusting of a fellow physician involved in the futility dispute, the
absence of any personal relationship will greatly lessen the potential
for professional bias. This solution will further remove any personal
biases of hospital staff, who might have become frustrated and
fatigued by the surrogate over time and consequently be less open to
reaching a fair decision. Those directly involved with the patient's
treatment might hold strong opinions about the case; therefore, these
individuals might be especially domineering and persistent in
committee discussions. 236 Lastly, the establishment of independent
boards will help to preserve the relationship between the surrogate
and the treating physician by placing ultimate decisionmaking
authority in the hands of a completely separate entity. When the
process is specified in the law, both surrogates and physicians will
accept that they are not being singled out and, in fact, likely will be
relieved that the decision does not rest on their shoulders alone. 237
4. Notification of Patient and Scheduling of Hearing
In order for the dispute resolution procedure to be effective in
the futility context, a case must be reviewed and a decision made in a
speedy, but thorough, manner. By contrast, court involvement in
futility disputes causes critical delay, during which the patient often
dies. 23 8 When an application is received, the panel would notify the
patient's surrogate as well as the treating physician of the submission

235. Decisionmaking criteria prohibiting the consideration of liability as well as qualified
immunity, discussed in Part III.B.7 infra, further ensure that liability concerns will not
contaminate the decisionmaking process.

236. Samuel L. Tilden, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Using an Identical Twin as a Skin
Transplant Donorfor a Severely Burned Minor, 1 AM. J.L. & MED. 87, 112-13 (2005) (describing
a committee in which the opinion of the "lone surgeon" "carried great weight with the
committee").
237. Fine, supra note 180, at 71 (observing that many decisionmakers "show guilt" and say
something like, "I know my dad wouldn't want to go on like this, but we just have to keep going
because I could never live with myself if I agreed to stop" but that with a clearer statutory
process, accept that they are not being singled out); Robert L. Fine & Thomas W. Mayo,

Resolution of Futility by Due Process: Early Experience with the Texas Advance Directives Act,
138 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 743, 745 (2003) (explaining that after Texas adopted a clearer process
for resolving futility disputes, patients were often relieved that they did not have to make end-oflife medical decisions on their own).

238. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Involuntary Passive Euthanasiain U.S. Courts: Reassessing the
JudicialTreatment of Medical Futility Cases, 9 MARQ. ELDER's ADVISOR 229, 237 (2008).
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within forty-eight hours from receipt. 239 Additionally, the notification
would state that a hearing has been scheduled and that the parties
have the rights to be present, to testify orally or in writing, and to
have a lawyer present. 240 These procedural requirements will prevent
the boards from relying too heavily on a patient's medical record, as
many ethics committees currently do, and instead will provide a morebalanced method of case review. 241 Again, because of the patient's
critical state, the hearing would be set within forty-eight hours after
the parties have received notice. 242
5. Information Gathering and Confidentiality
In order to ensure the panel's comprehensive assessment of the
case during the hearing, the panel chairperson would review the
application preliminarily to ascertain whether additional information
might be necessary to resolve the issues presented in the case. 243 The
chairperson, if necessary, would request from any healthcare provider
or institution any information relevant to the patient's medical care. 244
Some might be concerned with releasing private medical information
to a state board; however, the panel would be legally required to
maintain the confidentiality of these records. 245 Currently, no uniform
confidentiality exists for institutional ethics committees, even though
they regularly access confidential patient records. 246 Confidentiality
also makes the FDRB forum preferable to a court proceeding, in which
highly emotional and personal information could be made public. 247
On the other hand, some might respond that the boards could abuse
their power if they are allowed to operate behind closed doors under

239. Although the Iowa regulations require notification of these parties, they do not provide
a designated time frame. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-85.5(1) (2009).
240. Id.
241. See Fox et al., supra note 27, at 23 ("Whereas 87 of ECSs 'usually' or 'always' gathered
information through direct examination of the patient's medical record, only 54% 'usually' or
'always' gathered information through direct examination of the patient.' ").
242. See IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-85.5(1) ("The hearing shall be held no less than 48 hours
after the patient receives this notification.").
243. Id. at r. -85.5(2).
244. Id. at r. -85.5(2)(a).
245. Id.
246. See Fox et al., supra note 27, at 23 (finding a variety of practices for record-keeping and
reporting by ethics consultation services).
247. For example, litigation of the Terri Schiavo and Emilio Gonzalez cases received
widespread media coverage. Transcript of Jim Lehrer's Interview of Media Correspondent
Terrence Smith, NewsHour: Schiavo: Talk of the Nation (PBS television broadcast Mar. 24,
2005), availableat http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june05/schiavo_3-24.html.
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the guise of protecting the patient's confidentiality. 24 8 However, the
provisions requiring review by the state health agency assuage this
concern. Such a review procedure will allow the boards to keep
proceedings confidential while at the same time monitoring their
quality and content. 249
6. Hearing Procedures
The FDRB would follow an adjudicatory model of process, in
which the board would hear from both of the relevant parties and then
would render a decision. 250 Under this model, the panel would be
authorized to administer oaths and to take testimony from any person
who might assist the panel in making its decision. 251 In order to
facilitate the maximum amount of fact-finding, the hearing could be
conducted via telephone conference if deemed appropriate by the
chairperson, unless a party requests an in-person hearing. 252 A record
of the deliberations and proceedings of the panel would be made and
retained for ten years. 253 More specifically, this record would include
any information submitted to or considered by the panel, and it would
be held confidential. 2 54
The surrogate and the treating physician, or a representative
for either, would have the rights to be present at the hearing and to
express feelings orally or in writing. 255 Involving the surrogate in the
hearing might clarify any misunderstandings that she may have of the
patient's prognosis. 256 To render a valid determination to consent to or
refuse life-sustaining treatment on behalf of the patient, a majority of
248. Hoffmann, Regulating Ethics Committees, supranote 30, at 793 (citing this as a possible
concern).
249. Id. ("A provision that keeps the proceedings confidential with some exceptions for
monitoring of quality might satisfy both concerns.").

250. See generally Dianne E. Hoffmann, Evaluating Ethics Committees: A View from the
Outside, 71 MILBANK Q. 677, 690-94 (1993) (asserting that to provide the greatest amount of
patient protection, ethics committees should operate based on an adjudicatory model, which is
similar to a court proceeding in the sense that the committee will hear from the relevant
parties).
251. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-85.6(3)(a) (2009); Hoffmann, supra note 250, at 691.
252. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. -85.6(3)(a).
253. Id. at r. -85.6(3)(b).
254. Id. at r. -85.6(3)(b)-(c).
255. Iowa gives only the patient the right to be present at the hearing. Id. at r. -85.6(3)(d).
This clearly would be an unfair requirement in the futility dispute context.
256. See Kopelman, supra note 180, at 582 ("[S]tudies have shown that it is quite common for
families to misunderstand the information provided to them by physicians."); Shelton, supra note
102, at 121 (explaining that family members may seek an understanding of the patient's
prognosis and that a method of clarifying misunderstandings would be extremely beneficial in
resolving end-of-life disputes).
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the panel would be required to vote in the affirmative. 257 The panel
would be required to issue its written decision within twenty-four
hours of concluding the hearing and to send the decision to the
surrogate, the treating physician, and the institution involved in the
futility dispute. 258 The decision would describe the board's reasoning
in forgoing or continuing life-sustaining treatment. 259 This
requirement will assure both the parties to the dispute and the
reviewing state agency that the board followed a substantive
decisionmaking standard.
Opponents might argue that the mediation model, in the
futility context, provides a better form of dispute resolution than the
adjudicatory model. 260 Instead of rendering a decision based on the
information provided by the parties, a mediator would act as a
facilitator, assisting the parties to arrive at a mutually agreeable
solution. 261 A mediator often uses non-judicial techniques to help the
parties understand each other's interests, such as allowing parties to
discuss their emotions openly, summarizing or rewording statements
to ensure comprehension, and bridging any cultural gaps between the
parties. 262
Despite these potential advantages, mediation does not
adequately protect patient interests because there is no party whose
sole motive is to protect the patient. 263 Instead, each party has its own
individual interests at stake; for example, the physician may be
concerned with liability, finances, reputation, or workload, while the
surrogate may be affected by emotional, familial, religious, and
monetary concerns. By contrast, the adjudicatory model provides an
impartial panel of individuals whose only goal is to protect the patient.
Moreover, one party may be intimidated and effectively silenced by
the other during mediation. 264 By contrast, adjudication does not

257. This is a variation of IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-85.8(3), which requires a majority vote
for consent or refusal of "medical care." As previously mentioned, the definition of "medical care"
explicitly excludes the discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment, thus the Iowa SMDBs are not
authorized to make futility decisions. Id. at r. -85.2(5).
258. Id. at r. -85.6(3)(f).
259. No similar provision exists for the Iowa SMDBs.
260. See generally Bierlein, supra note 65, at 62-64 (proposing an approach to bioethics
mediation); Shelton, supra note 102 ("Mediation of end-of-life treatment disputes provides a
forum to counterbalance the coercive nature of the right to terminate treatment.").
261. Shelton, supra note 102, at 134.
262. Id. at 134-35.
263. Hoffmann, supra note 250, at 693.
264. Pope & Waldman, supra note 173, at 149 (arguing that ethics committee mediations are
currently just "one-sided negotiations in which surrogates are sure to prevail" because
healthcare decisions law gives surrogates disproportionate power).
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depend solely on the bargaining power of the parties and instead
requires a majority of panel members to reach a decision
independently, thus leveling the playing field between the surrogate
and the physician.
7. Decisionmaking and Evidentiary Standards
The panel's decisionmaking standard would mirror the
substituted-judgment and best-interest framework, the common law
standard for making medical decisions for incompetent patients. 265 In
making a determination regarding the patient's medical care, the
panel would presume the past and present expression of the patient's
wishes to be valid unless clearly overcome by the evidence. 266 In this
way, the patient's autonomy will be the central principle of
decisionmaking. 267 If there is no clear preference by the patient, the
panel then would determine whether the proposed medical care is in
the best interest of the patient based upon clear and convincing
evidence. 268 This standard is also designed to promote the patient's
autonomy, because the assumption is that the patient would have
chosen what was in his or her best interest. 2 69
In order to further prevent contamination of the
decisionmaking process, FDRBs would be explicitly prohibited from
considering the benefits or burdens to any third party. 270 Therefore,
panel members would be prohibited from considering the emotional
needs or religious beliefs of the patient's family. Furthermore, the
committee would be prohibited from discussing potential liability for
forgoing treatment. Instead, the board could consult an attorney only
after a medical and ethical decision has been reached for advice on the
appropriate procedure to follow to execute the committee's decision.
Finally, panel members would be prohibited from considering
265. Hoffmann, supra note 61, at 839-41.
266. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-85.8(1) (2009).
267. Id. ("The patient's autonomy should always be respected."); see Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431-34 (Mass. 1977) (defining the actual,
autonomously determined interests of the patient as the paramount guiding principle under both
the substituted judgment standard and the best interest standard).
268. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-85.8(2) requires only a preponderance of the evidence.
However, courts have mandated the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence when the
individual interests at stake in the proceeding are particularly important and more substantial
than the mere loss of money. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990).
Because the individual and societal interests at stake in the resolution of a futility dispute are
quite substantial, this higher evidentiary standard is more appropriate.
269. O'Callaghan, supra note 204, at 578.
270. The provisions proposed in this paragraph are not included in the Iowa SMDB
regulations.
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potential financial costs associated with life-sustaining treatment,
including coverage by insurance providers.
By explicitly defining the decisionmaking framework, FDRBs
would be given a clear purpose: to protect the patient. 27 1 By contrast,
ethics committees are often confused about their role, stating that
their goals include not only protecting the patient, but also reducing
the risk of legal liability, providing moral support to staff, and
increasing patient and family satisfaction. 2 7 2 This patient-centered
standard will further protect the physician's autonomy, as any
decision focused on protecting the patient will not require the
physician to provide harmful or non-beneficial treatment. To be sure,
boards would consider the following factors in determining the best
interest of the patient: (1) whether the benefits of treatment outweigh
the burdens in terms of pain and suffering; (2) the degree, expected
duration, and constancy of pain with and without treatment; (3)
whether any pain could be mitigated by less intrusive forms of medical
treatment; (4) an evaluation of treatment options and their risks and
benefits; and (5) the likely prognosis and expectant level of functioning
with or without the proposed medical care. 2 7 3 An FDRB evaluating
these factors thus would render patient-centered decisions in futility
disputes, necessarily safeguarding the physician's right not to provide
treatment that is futile or harmful.
Some might question why these standards could not be applied
merely to ethics committees instead of creating a new state-operated
mechanism for resolving futility disputes. Indeed, many have
advocated creating formal standards for clinical ethics consultation. 2 74
In fact, on June 16, 2009, the American Society for Bioethics and
271. Hoffmann, Regulating Ethics Committees, supra note 30, at 767 ("[T]he stated purpose
of ethics committees since their inception has been to protect the patient. . . .").
272. Robert Klitzman, Additional Implications of a National Survey on Ethics Consultation
in United States Hospitals, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Feb. 2007, at 47.
273. IOWA ADMIN. CODE. r. 641-85.8(2)(a)-(d) (slightly reworded to achieve better balance of
interests).
274. E.g., Mark P. Aulisio et al., supra note 36, at 59-66 (summarizing the conclusions of the
American Society for Bioethics and Humanities Task Force report on the core competencies for
healthcare ethics consultation); Nancy N. Dubler & Jeffrey Blustein, Credentialing Ethics
Consultants:An Invitation to Collaboration,AM. J. BIOETHICS, Feb. 2007, at 35 ("It has been
clear for some time that there is a need for substantive standards for-and a clear nation of
process to direct-clinical ethics consultation. It should not be the case that a service this
common proceeds with no precise idea of who is qualified to do these consultations, what
educational background and skills are needed, and how consultations should be conducted,
documented, and reviewed for quality."). But see Jeffrey P. Bishop et al., Of Goals and Goods and
FlounderingAbout: A Dissensus Report on Clinical Ethics Consultation,21 HEC FORUM 275, 278
(2009) (contending that the standardization of clinical ethics consultation obscures the "goods"
that are fundamental to the field (e.g., listening, interpretative skills, moral inquiry), which
inherently resist standardization).
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Humanities announced its decision to create a standing committee
that will develop ethics consultation standards and methods of
implementation. 27 5 However, applying standards to internal ethics
committees will not eliminate the conflicts of interest that arise out of
their employment by the healthcare institution. Even though ethics
committee members may attempt to follow procedural and substantive
rules, other financial, legal, and professional considerations
necessarily will factor into their decisions so long as they have an
employment relationship with the healthcare institution involved in
the futility dispute. 276 Such conflicts place ethics committee members
in the position of shading an opinion to avoid personal risks, a goal
that may be adverse to the patient's best interest. 27 7 The only way to
remove the bias that currently affects the resolution of futility
disputes in ethics committees is to sever the relationship between the
individuals resolving the dispute and the healthcare institution.
Independent state and county decisionmaking boards, operating with
uniform requirements and procedures, would promote impartial
decisions to forgo or continue life-sustaining treatment.
8. Qualified Immunity from Liability
The FDRB, its members, and anyone acting in good-faith
reliance on an FDRB decision would be immunized from civil and
criminal liability for any actions taken or omissions made in the
official discharge of their duties, except those acts committed in bad
faith or with malicious purpose. 278 Without providing this immunity,
individuals would be deterred from serving on the board.
Furthermore, the fear of lawsuits would hinder the board members'
ability to do their job, as they may be reluctant to discuss cases fully
and openly if they fear liability for themselves or others. Immunity is
typically granted when an important public interest necessitates that
a function be performed carefully and free from the concern of
potential liability. 279 The general public has a compelling interest in a
board's careful determination of whether an incompetent patient's life275. Bishop et al., supra note 274, at 278.
276. See Linda T. Powell, Hospital Ethics Committees and the Future of HealthcareDecision
Making, 20 HosP. MATERIEL MGMT. Q., Aug. 1998, at 82, 83 ("It is likely that committee
members will act from a sense of duty to the institution, their fellow professionals, and the
preservation of health resources.").
277. Aulisio et al., supra note 36, at 66.
278. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-85.12 provides qualified immunity for Iowa SMDBs, except
for those acts or omissions "constituting willful or wanton misconduct." An exception for actions
taken in bad faith or with malicious purpose appeared to create a clearer standard.
279. O'Callaghan, supra note 204, at 572.
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sustaining treatment should be continued; therefore, FDRBs would
appear deserving of such immunity.
Importantly, FDRBs members would be granted qualified
immunity, whereby an individual is insulated from liability unless she
violates an objective standard of care. 280 It is difficult to imagine that a
group of public officials serving on an independent medical
decisionmaking board would endorse a decision in bad faith or with a
malevolent intent. Nonetheless, this exception to the grant of
immunity would protect the patient from such a possibility. In
addition, the qualified immunity provision would encourage
healthcare institutions to consult FDRBs. Board members and anyone
relying in good faith on a board's decision would be protected from
liability. Due to vague legislation regarding the appropriate way to
deal with a futility dispute, healthcare providers currently are
uncertain of whether their actions will lead to liability-even if they
consult an ethics committee. For that reason, it seems obvious that
healthcare providers would want to utilize an independent dispute
resolution mechanism that makes decisions under legally imposed
standards, resulting in immunity for anyone relying on this decision
in good faith.
9. Review of State and Local Board Decisions
To ensure that these regulations are followed, an oversight
mechanism is needed. Both state and local FDRBs would be required
to file records of the presentation of evidence, the discussion, and the
decision in every case with the state's appropriate health
department. 281 These records would be filed within five business days
of the final decision. A healthcare institution would be authorized to
act on a board's decision before it has been reviewed by the state
agency. However, if the state agency finds that a board has not
complied with the above requirements, the institution may be subject
to sanctions. Additionally, the boards would submit an annual report
to the state health department. This report would include summary
information regarding the number, nature, and disposition of
280. See id. at 571 (defining qualified immunity as "a standard by which an official is
insulated from liability unless he violates clearly established rights of which a reasonable person
would know" and contrasting this with absolute immunity).
281. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-84.8 and -85.11 require only that the local board submit an
annual report to the state board for review, and that the report must contain a summary of
information regarding the number, nature, and disposition of applications filed with the local
board in the preceding year. This proposal places oversight authority in the state's department of
health, requires review of the state board, provides more detailed reporting requirements, and
provides the possibility of sanctions for noncompliance.
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applications filed with the local board in the preceding year. This
comprehensive report would allow evaluators to ensure that decisions
are being made consistently and without bias, with particular
attention to patients in traditionally vulnerable or disadvantaged
groups (e.g., minorities, women, the poor, the homeless, or individuals
without family members). 282
CONCLUSION
Many sources predict the increasing prevalence of disputes
regarding the medical futility of life-sustaining treatment. 283 As the
costs of healthcare continue to become a more significant social and
political issue, healthcare institutions and third-party payers will
come under increased pressure to cut costs. 2 84 As the public gains
awareness of this danger, patients and families are likely to resist a
physician's recommendation to withdraw life-sustaining treatment out
of fear that financial pressures, rather than the best interest of the
patient, are motivating the assessment. 285 In addition, advances in
medical technology that can sustain life-but not necessarily cure
illness-will make end-of-life decisions more complex
and
contentious. 286 Finally, the rising percentage of the elderly population
in the United States, predicted to be 17.7 percent by 2020, will cause a
corresponding increase in difficult medical decisions regarding end-oflife treatment. 287
282. See Hoffmann, supra note 250, at 695 (providing that evaluators of ethics committees
must try to assure that there is no statistically significant difference in ethics committee
recommendations for certain vulnerable or traditionally disadvantaged groups).
283. See, e.g., MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 10, §§ 13.01, 13.09 (describing the current
state of futility disputes, how they are likely to change in the future, and likely future legal and
extra-legal means to resolve them); Pam Belluck, Even as Doctors Say Enough, Families Fight to
Prolong Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at Al ("About 15 years ago, at least 80 percent of the
cases were right-to-die kinds of cases . . . . Today, it's more like at least 80 percent of the cases
are the other direction: family members who are pushing for continued or more aggressive life
support and doctors and nurses who think that that's wrong." (quoting Dr. Lachlan Forrow, Dir.,
Ethics Program, Beth Israel Deaconness Med. Ctr., Boston, MA)).
284. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 10, § 13.09.
285. Id.
286. Fine, supra note 180, at 60. An example of a so-called "halfway technology" is a machine
that supplants the function of failed organs. Id.; see also Partners CEO Addresses Ethical
Challenges, (New England Cable News television broadcast Mar. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.necn.comlBostonlBusiness/2009/03/03/Partners-CEO-addressesethical/1236125930.html (quoting an executive of a large Boston healthcare corporation as
stating "End-of-life issues will become even more significant as medicine advances and society
ages.").
287. See Elizabeth B. Herrington, Strengthening the Older Americans Act's Long-Term Care
Protection Provisions: A Call for Further Improvement of Important State Ombudsman
Programs, 5 ELDER L.J. 321, 325-326 (1997) (citing the Population Reference Bureau's
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It is therefore becoming increasingly vital that states develop a
fair, impartial, and patient-centered method of resolving futility
disputes. Legislation such as the UHCDA has failed to provide a clear
dispute resolution procedure, and most agree that the judicial
resolution of these disputes is not preferable due to the complexity of
medical and ethical issues involved, the highly emotional nature of
these disputes, the length of time required by court proceedings, and
the financial costs to both families and healthcare institutions. 288 To
avoid these obstacles, many commentators, courts, and healthcare
institutions have endorsed an alternative forum for resolving end-oflife disputes: the institutional ethics committee. 289 Even though ethics
committees are normally authorized to give recommendations to the
healthcare institution, these recommendations often have the
practical import of a final and authoritative decision in the futility
dispute context. 290
Despite this degree of influence over life-and-death decisions,
ethics committees operate free from any form of regulation
whatsoever, 291 which is particularly troubling given that these
committees are comprised almost entirely of hospital staff.2 9 2 Because
most ethics committee members are employed by the healthcare
institution, these individuals are likely to be influenced by the
financial, legal, and professional benefits or burdens of their decisions
on that institution. 293 Given this substantial risk of bias in end-of-life
medical decisions, the law must provide better protection for
incompetent patients who cannot speak for themselves. 294

prediction that the number of those at least sixty-five is expected to rise from 12.6 percent in
1997 to 17.7 percent in 2020).
288. Cohen, supra note 21, § 18.06 (explaining that these groups have reached this
agreement because court proceedings can be time-consuming and emotionally and financially
costly for both patients and providers and citing several decisions that support this conclusion).
289. See id. § 18.06 ("To avoid some of the negative aspects of judicial intervention,
institutional dispute resolution mechanisms have been created . . . . One mechanism for
resolving disputes that deserves special attention is the institutional ethics committee.").
290. Capron, supra note 29, at 422.
291. Spielman, supra note 33, at 180.
292. Hoffmann, Does Legislating Hospital Ethics Committees Make Sense?, supra note 30, at
108, 115 (reporting the results of a multi-state survey in which it was determined that nearly all
members of ethics committees, even legal counsel, were hospital employees and the vast majority
were health professionals and that 42 percent of respondents in a survey of hospital staff in five
Maryland hospitals "thought that the role of the [ethics committee] was to decide ethical issues");
Hoffman, Regulating Ethics Committees, supra note 30, at 758-61 (outlining many of the same
findings).
293. See supra Part II.
294. See Pope, supra note 31, at 274-84 ("For example, a treatment decision may be biased
when the decision maker is prejudiced against the race of the patient.").
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Futility disputes should be taken out of the hands of
institutional ethics committees and instead resolved by independent
Futility Dispute Resolution Boards. Modeled after the Iowa Substitute
Medical Decision-Making Boards, 295 these new boards would operate
at the state and local level and would be required to follow specific
substantive and procedural regulations. More specifically, FDRBs
would be required to comply with rules regarding composition;
accessibility; procedures for application submission and information
gathering; procedures for conducting the hearing, reporting, and state
agency review; and a substantive decisionmaking standard. This
solution upholds the patient's right to make autonomous medical
decisions by limiting the considerations that can factor into a futility
dispute decision. In doing do, it further protects the physician's right
to resist a surrogate's request to provide treatment that would be
harmful or ineffective in treating the patient's illness. Finally, it
provides a clear, statutory procedure for resolving futility disputes,
thus ensuring a neutral and effective forum for consideration of thirdparty decisions affecting the well-being of incompetent patients.
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